

Political Dynasties in Governance and Regional Financial Transparency

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Abstrak

Fenomena politik dinasti di Indonesia tidak hanya terjadi di tingkat nasional, tetapi juga mengakar kuat di tingkat daerah, memberikan ruang bagi elite lokal untuk membangun dan mempertahankan kekuasaan secara turun-temurun. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis interaksi antara politik dinasti dan proses birokrasi dalam pemerintahan daerah melalui prinsip-prinsip good governance, khususnya transparansi dan efektivitas. Kajian literatur sistematis digunakan dalam penelitian ini, dengan menggabungkan meta-sintesis dan meta-analisis terhadap temuan-temuan sebelumnya yang berkaitan dengan dampak politik dinasti terhadap tata kelola pemerintahan dan manajemen keuangan daerah. VOSViewer digunakan sebagai alat analisis untuk mengidentifikasi tren penelitian, tipologi politik dinasti, dan implikasinya. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa politik dinasti dapat menghambat profesionalisme dan netralitas birokrasi, serta mengurangi kepercayaan publik terhadap institusi. Namun, penerapan sistem informasi yang transparan seperti situs web Badan Pengelola Keuangan dan Aset Daerah (BPKAD) memungkinkan pengawasan publik yang lebih efektif, meskipun dihadapkan pada tantangan kapasitas sumber daya manusia dan infrastruktur teknologi. Studi ini menekankan pentingnya kolaborasi antar pemangku kepentingan untuk meningkatkan kinerja birokrasi dan implementasi e-governance di wilayah yang dikuasai oleh dinasti politik.

Kata Kunci: Politik dinasti; E-governance; BPKAD; Transparansi; Keuangan daerah

Abstract

The phenomenon of political dynasties in Indonesia occurs not only at the national level but is also deeply rooted at the regional level, providing space for local elites to establish and sustain hereditary power. This study aims to analyze the interaction between dynastic politics and bureaucratic processes in regional governments through the lens of good governance principles, particularly transparency and effectiveness. A systematic literature review was employed, incorporating meta-synthesis and meta-analysis of previous findings related to the impact of political dynasties on local governance and financial management. VOSviewer was utilized as an analytical tool to identify research trends, typologies of political dynasties, and their implications. The findings indicate that political dynasties may hinder bureaucratic professionalism and neutrality, while also diminishing public trust in institutions. However, the implementation of transparent information systems, such as the regional financial management agency (BPKAD) websites, enables more effective public oversight, despite challenges related to human resource capacity and technological infrastructure. The study highlights the need for stakeholder collaboration to enhance bureaucratic performance and e-governance implementation in dynasty-dominated regions.

Keywords: Dynasty politics; E-governance; BPKAD; Transparency; Regional finance

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of political dynasties in Indonesia has become a significant focus of attention among the public, academics, and other stakeholders in recent decades, especially following the Reform and decentralization eras in the late 1990s. Political dynasties, characterized by the inheritance and concentration of political power within specific families or elite groups, have evolved into a deeply rooted and complex form of nepotism, which is regarded as a serious threat to the fundamental principles of good governance in public policy implementation. According to Robert Dahl's theory presented in "Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961" democracy requires a fair distribution of power. Political dynasties, which concentrate authority within a single family or elite group, pose a threat to democratic principles and good governance. This practice is not only prevalent at the national level but has also taken deep root at the regional level, particularly following the implementation of regional autonomy policies that grant local governments greater authority and discretion in managing resources, formulating policies, and administering governance (Fitriyah, 2020).

Political dynasties, often referred to as political nepotism, involve the inheritance or transfer of political positions among family members of public officials or politicians, either through electoral contests or direct appointments (Sutisna, 2023). This phenomenon has raised global concern due to its potential to undermine democratic quality and governance (Kenawas, 2015), through a study of the United States Congress, found that legislators with family ties in politics were four times more likely to be re-elected compared to those without such connections. This advantage largely stems from factors such as family name recognition, established political networks, and privileged access to campaign resources. Furthermore, research by (Asako et al., 2015) in the Philippines revealed that dynastic politicians tend to have lower legislative performance, as measured by attendance rates and the number of bills proposed, compared to non-dynastic politicians.

Indonesia's political landscape has experienced a significant shift with the rising prevalence of political dynasties at various levels of government. A study by (Khairi, 2022) revealed an alarming trend: at least 58 out of 270 regional heads had familial ties to previous officeholders, a substantial increase from 33 regional heads in 2015.

This phenomenon reflects the growing consolidation of power in the hands of a few political families. It not only limits elite circulation and leadership regeneration but also undermines the meritocratic principles in the selection of public leaders (Shahnaz et al., 2024). In Indonesia's democratic context, the rise of political dynasties raises serious concerns regarding the quality of democracy: does the electoral process genuinely reflect the people's will, or is it manipulated by the power and resources controlled by political dynasties? Moreover, this phenomenon indicates an inequality of access to political and economic resources, where certain families are able to build and sustain power networks across generations, while the majority of citizens remain marginalized from political processes.

The issue extends beyond the executive domain and has also extensively infiltrated legislative structures. As documented by (Abdussamad et al., 2023), around 11% of members of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) for the 2014–2019 period had familial ties to politicians or officials. At the regional legislative council (DPRD) level, the figure is even more alarming, reaching up to 20% in several provinces. The infiltration of political dynasties into legislative bodies has profound and far-reaching implications. Legislatures, which are supposed to represent diverse public interests and act as a check on executive power, risk becoming mere extensions of dynastic interests. This can lead to distortions in legislative processes, where laws and policies disproportionately favor dynastic groups over broader public welfare.

Moreover, the legislative oversight function over the executive can weaken when collusion between executive and legislative dynasties occurs, thereby undermining the checks and balances fundamental to democratic systems. In the long term, this situation could erode public trust in democratic institutions and create the perception that politics merely serves elite interests rather than the common good.

Political dynasties threaten the core principles of good governance, which are vital for effective and accountable public administration. Transparency, as one of the main pillars of good governance, is often compromised under dynastic systems. Research by (Anggraini & Riharjo, 2017) revealed that regions with higher levels of political dynasties tend to have lower budget transparency scores. This is attributed to a tendency among dynastic leaders to restrict public access to information to protect familial interests and lucrative practices. This lack of transparency extends beyond budgeting into other aspects

of governance. For instance, in public procurement processes, major tenders are often won by companies affiliated with ruling families.

Tender information and assessment criteria are frequently not disclosed comprehensively, raising suspicions of nepotism and corruption. Furthermore, the lack of transparency negatively affects public service quality: when citizens have insufficient access to budget and program information, their ability to monitor and evaluate government performance diminishes.

The implementation of good governance principles has been a key agenda in bureaucratic and governance reforms since the Reform era. Law No. 28 of 1999 concerning the Clean and Free State Administration from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism emphasizes the importance of good governance principles. Additionally, Law No. 32 of 2009 explicitly lists nine principles of good governance that must be applied: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, and strategic vision (Rohman & Hanafi, 2019). However, implementing these principles faces various challenges. A study by (Wijanarti, 2016) found that despite improvements in budget transparency and public participation in development planning, a significant gap persists between regulations and practices on the ground. Factors hindering implementation include inadequate capacity among government officials, resistance from entrenched bureaucratic structures, and weak oversight and law enforcement mechanisms.

The application of good governance principles has direct implications for public policy quality and development effectiveness. Comparative studies by (Murdiyana & Mulyana, 2017) on poverty alleviation programs in five Indonesian provinces revealed that regions with higher governance scores achieved better program outcomes. Contributing factors included more participatory planning, more efficient budget allocation, and more effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Similarly (Jundia et al., 2023), in their analysis of local education policy implementation, found a positive correlation between government transparency and accountability and improved education service quality and student learning outcomes. They emphasized the importance of information openness and public participation in ensuring the optimal use of limited educational resources.

The long-term implications of poor transparency and participation under political dynasties are severe. Public distrust towards governmental institutions increases, threatening the legitimacy of democratic systems. Citizens become apathetic and disengaged from formal political processes, feeling that their voices are neither heard nor impactful. This creates a vicious cycle: the lower the public participation, the greater the leeway for dynastic elites to consolidate their power. From an economic development perspective, policies produced under dynastic political systems tend to be extractive rather than inclusive. Public resources are directed more towards maintaining dynastic power and enriching inner circles rather than fostering equitable economic growth. Consequently, social and economic inequalities widen, potentially leading to social and political instability. Over the long term, this situation hampers sustainable development and diminishes the competitiveness of regions and the nation globally.

Political dynasties reflect a negative peak in a politician's career, as many pass down political legacies to their family members (Rahma et al., 2022). Thus, this paper aims to examine trends in political dynasty research, various forms of political dynasties, and their implications.

METHODS

This article employs a systematic literature review (SLR) approach to analyze the impact of political dynasties on local governance and their alignment with the principles of good governance, particularly in regions dominated by political dynasties. This method was selected for its ability to integrate and synthesize findings from previous empirical studies, theories, and policy documents in a comprehensive manner, enabling a deep understanding of the phenomenon through descriptive data. The study uses secondary data obtained from reputable national and international journals, previous research, and other scholarly sources.


To ensure a balanced and comprehensive analysis, the systematic literature review is combined with both meta-synthesis and meta-analysis techniques (Pratami, 2022). This integration aims to generate new insights or concepts by merging relevant findings from previous studies, scientific articles, and books. When these two methods are combined in a systematic review, researchers can leverage the strengths of each approach. This integration allows researchers not only to obtain a quantitative overview of the data but

also to understand the context and nuances that may be overlooked in purely quantitative analyses. This is particularly important in fields such as education and the social sciences, where qualitative factors often play a significant role in research outcomes

The author then utilized the Dimensions website as a data source to access relevant scholarly articles, with certain limitations applied to the data for analysis. The data were obtained using the keyword “Political Dynasty and Financial Transparency.” The initial search yielded 101 articles. The author applied exclusion criteria based on the language of the articles written in Indonesian and publication years ranging from 2015 to 2024. After refining the search criteria, 94 articles were selected for the literature review analysis.

The stages of writing this article began with the author conducting a search for scholarly articles on the Dimensions website using predetermined keywords. Once the data was collected, the author performed data exclusion to refine the dataset for generating graphs based on the search results. Subsequently, the author analyzed the relevant article publications to identify patterns, themes, and research trends related to the topic. Following data observation, the author carried out conceptualization or categorization using the Grounded Theory approach to develop a robust new theoretical framework. This approach allows for theory building that emerges directly from the data, making it highly suitable for exploratory research. The collected data was then visualized using VOSViewer software as part of the analytical process in each section of the discussion. Through this methodological process, the study ensures a comprehensive and systematic analysis that strengthens the credibility and academic value of the findings (Aji, 2024).

Figure 1. Graph of scholarly article publications based on keyword from 2015 to 2024




Based on the specified search results, Figure 1 presents a graph of article publications by year, from 2015 to 2024. The trend of publications using the keywords “Political Dynasty and Financial Transparency” shows fluctuations over time. In 2017, the number of scholarly articles related to these keywords reached its lowest point, with only two articles published according to data from the Dimensions database. In contrast, the highest number of publications occurred in 2023, with a total of 25 articles on the same topic.

Although in 2017 the publication of articles on “Political Dynasties and Financial Transparency” reached its lowest point, a noticeable increase occurred from 2018 to 2023, (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2023) with a total of 72 articles published during that period. This upward trend indicates growing academic interest and concern regarding the influence of political dynasties on governance and regional financial transparency. However, in 2024, there was a decline in publications, with only 11 articles published up to November. This decrease may be attributed to shifting research priorities, limited funding, or saturation in certain areas of the topic. It could also reflect the challenges researchers face in accessing relevant data or conducting fieldwork on politically sensitive issues. Despite the drop, the accumulated body of literature over the past six years provides a valuable foundation for ongoing inquiry. Researchers are encouraged to explore emerging dimensions of this issue, such as the role of digital transparency tools

and public participation in regions controlled by political dynasties. Continued scholarly attention is essential to ensure that critical issues surrounding governance and financial transparency remain at the forefront of academic and policy discussions (Gaol et al., 2024).

This qualitative descriptive study employs the Grounded Theory approach as its foundational method, a technique widely recognized for its rigor in qualitative literature reviews. Grounded Theory facilitates systematic and specific data observation, from which broader, more general conclusions emerge to build a robust theoretical framework (Kosasih, 2018). The research begins with meticulous and structured data collection from existing literature, followed by iterative coding (open, axial, and selective) to extract core categories and themes intrinsic to the governance context. This bottom-up method ensures that emerging theories are firmly rooted in empirical data rather than predetermined hypotheses an approach strongly advocated in the study by (Abidin, 2021). The study then employs categorization techniques to organize these themes into coherent theoretical constructs, aligning with established academic standards. Through grounded conceptual development, the research builds toward a generalizable theoretical model that explains the interaction between political dynasties and bureaucratic governance. Finally, the data processed through these stages are visualized using VOSviewer to validate thematic connections and enhance interpretative clarity. This methodical sequence from observation and coding to conceptualization and visualization ensures the study produces a strong, context-sensitive theory with academic and policy relevance.

Figure 2. Grounded Theory Diagram



Source: Processed by the author

In the initial stage of data analysis, the authors conducted data conceptualization by assigning terms to concepts observed during the review of previous studies. Following this conceptualization, categories were formed based on these terms or concepts and were grouped according to their similarities. Once the concepts had been categorized, the authors named the relevant categories and organized them based on their respective characteristics (Zuchdi & Afifah, 2019).

This process involved identifying themes or categories found within the literature. Using secondary data sources, these themes were coded or categorized, eventually leading to the formation of new concepts (Fitri & Febrianti, 2018). According to Fitri (2018), open coding begins when the authors first obtain the data, with each idea in the data labeled accordingly. During axial coding, the authors reassembled the data that had been categorized through open coding, reviewing broader themes to regroup the initial categories into new forms that constitute the main categories. These were then labeled using previously identified terms and documented in the literature. The third step, selective coding, involved identifying the relationships among core phenomena to establish a coherent narrative. At this stage, all elements of the emerging theory were integrated, focusing on the most significant ideas.

on data from the 2020 Regional Head Election (PILKADA). The ease of access to public information allows citizens to monitor and control government actions, thereby increasing public trust in government institutions (Valentina, 2024). Hence, the author introduces a new conceptual approach that integrates technological advancements by emphasizing the relevance of the BPKAD website in promoting transparency in local government financial reports.

The 2020 simultaneous regional elections were held on December 9, 2020, covering 270 regions, including 9 provinces, 224 regencies, and 37 cities. Out of these, 16 regions had to conduct re-elections, in accordance with constitutional provisions and decisions issued by the Constitutional Court (MK). These re-elections were generally triggered by disputes over election results filed by candidate pairs who alleged procedural violations (Pratolo & Diah Irmawati, 2020).

According to data from the 2020 Regional Election Census, a total of 804 candidates participated in the elections. Of this number, around 135 candidates, or approximately 16.8%, were found to have familial ties to previous politicians or government officials, directly indicating the presence of dynastic political influence in the candidate nomination process. This means that more than one in six candidates in the regional elections had connections to political dynasties, whether through nuclear or extended family relationships.

A breakdown of the data reveals that the phenomenon of political dynasties is not confined to a single level of government but spans various categories of positions in regional administrations. Most dynastic candidates came from the regency level, followed by the municipal and then the provincial levels (Khairi, 2022). This indicates that political dynasties are more deeply entrenched in smaller-scale regional governments, where family networks tend to play a dominant role in influencing election outcomes.

These findings provide concrete evidence that political dynasties have become an integral part of the local democratic process in Indonesia. Moreover, the high proportion of dynastic candidates reflects a weak political party recruitment system, which tends to prioritize family name recognition over candidate competence. This phenomenon raises serious concerns about the future quality of democracy and regional governance.

Table 1. Total Levels of Regional Government Involved in Political Dynasties in 2020

No.	Level of Regional Government	Number of Dynasties Candidates	%
1	Governor/Deputy Governor	4	6,6
2	Mayor/Deputy Mayor	32	23,7
3	Regent/Deputy Regent	97	71,9
	Total	135	100

Source: (Khairi, 2022)

The data presented clearly indicate that political dynasties dominate various levels of regional government, with the strongest influence observed at the regency level. Out of 224 regions that held regent elections in 2020, 83 regions—or approximately 37%—had candidates for regional head positions who were affiliated with political dynasties. This phenomenon highlights the deep-rooted presence of dynastic politics in regency areas, where familial ties often serve as a primary factor in the nomination process. This dominance not only reflects the weakness of political regeneration systems but also demonstrates a tendency for family power to be used as a means of maintaining political control.

At the municipal level, the situation is not significantly different. Of the 37 regions that held mayoral elections in the same year, 21 regions—or 56.7%—had candidate pairs associated with political dynasties. Although fewer in number, this percentage is higher than that of the regency level. The high percentage may reflect more structured kinship-based political influence in urban areas, where political dynamics often involve local elites with extensive and established networks (Ningsih et al., 2023).

At the provincial level, although fewer regions held gubernatorial elections—only 9 provinces—the influence of political dynasties remained significant. Six out of the 9 provinces, or 66.6%, had candidates for governor or deputy governor with political family ties. This indicates that political dynasties are capable of penetrating higher levels of government, where the governor position is often used as a stepping stone to build broader influence at the national level. Political dynasties have the capacity to infiltrate higher levels of governance, where the governorship is often used as a strategic stepping stone to expand influence at the national level. In nine provinces, 66.6% of gubernatorial or deputy gubernatorial candidates are linked by kinship, underscoring the deep penetration of familial networks into provincial politics. Susanti (2017) highlights that political

parties tend to favor candidates from elite families, allowing dynastic networks to dominate party mechanisms and curtail democratic competition. This entrenched dynastic practice undermines checks and balances and enables the replication of existing power structures at successive levels of governance. Provincial leaders, backed by their political lineage, can leverage their office to gain national-level prominence bolstering name recognition, securing party endorsements, and accumulating financial and electoral resources. Moreover, these dynamics reduce the space for outsider candidates, limiting democratic renewal. Susanti's study emphasizes that such patterns threaten the consolidation of a democratic meritocracy and can lead to oligarchic control within political institutions. Therefore, institutional reforms such as stricter recruitment rules and enhanced transparency are vital to disrupt these entrenched dynastic trajectories.

This phenomenon illustrates that political dynasties are not merely a local political strategy but have evolved into a deeply entrenched political culture. Khairi (2022) confirms that political dynasties are no longer a sporadic phenomenon but have become a systemic pattern in local Indonesian politics. Furthermore, Fitriyah (2020) notes that political dynasties often sacrifice the principles of meritocracy and competence, negatively impacting leadership quality and public service delivery.

The dominance of political dynasties underscores the urgent need for deep reforms in Indonesia's political and electoral systems. Strengthening regulations to limit dynastic political practices and enhancing public participation in elections are critical steps to ensuring a more inclusive and competitive democracy. Therefore, this challenge must be addressed through proactive policies aimed at creating a more equitable and open political space for all segments of society.

Table 2. Number of Regional Head Candidate Pairs to Political Dynasties in the 2020 Regional Elections (PILKADA)

No	Province	Number of Pairs	Dynastic Pairs	
			Total	%
1	Sumatera Barat	113	4	3,5
2	Sumatera Selatan	13	4	30,7
3	Sumatera Utara	65	8	12,3
4	Riau	34	4	11,7
5	Kepulauan Riau	17	4	23,5
6	Bengkulu	26	2	7,6
7	Bangka Belitung	11	3	27,7
8	Jambi	15	5	33,3
9	Lampung	23	4	17,3
10	Banten	11	8	72,7
11	Jawa Barat	28	4	14,2
12	Jawa Tengah	41	15	36,5
13	DI Yogyakarta	9	2	22,2
14	Jawa Timur	42	11	26,2
15	Bali	11	3	27,2
16	Nusa Tenggara Barat	23	8	34,7
17	Nusa Tenggara Timur	27	2	7,4
18	Kalimantan Barat	23	1	4,3
19	Kalimantan Selatan	21	2	9,5
20	Kalimantan Tengah	6	1	16,6
21	Kalimantan Timur	20	4	20
22	Kalimantan Utara	16	2	12,5
23	Sulawesi Barat	8	4	50
24	Sulawesi Selatan	33	10	30,3
25	Sulawesi Tengah	27	5	18,5
26	Sulawesi Utara	24	7	29,1
27	Gorontalo	12	4	33,3
28	Sulawesi Tenggara	18	0	0
29	Maluku	11	1	9
30	Maluku Utara	23	3	13
31	Papua	34	0	0
32	Papua Barat	19	0	0

Source: (Khairi, 2022)

Based on the research by Khairi, the phenomenon of dynastic politics in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections shows a significant presence, reflecting the condition of local democracy in Indonesia, which is influenced by political kinship factors. From the 270 regions that held regional elections, consisting of 9 provinces, 224 districts, and 37 cities, there was a total of 804 pairs of candidates for regional leadership contests. Of these, 135 pairs or 16.8% were found to have ties to dynastic politics. This figure indicates that almost one in five pairs of candidates competing had political kinship ties, showing the strong roots of political dynasties in various regions.

This phenomenon spread across 29 out of 32 provinces that held regional elections, indicating that dynastic politics has become a widespread phenomenon and is not limited to specific areas. At the gubernatorial election level, of the 9 provinces that held elections,

6 regions or about 66.6% had gubernatorial or vice-gubernatorial candidates linked to dynastic politics. At the district level, 83 out of 224 districts, or about 37%, had candidates for regent/vice-regent with a dynastic political background. Meanwhile, at the city level, 21 out of 37 cities, or 56.7%, had mayoral/vice-mayoral candidates associated with political dynasties.

This data indicates that the dynastic politics phenomenon is more dominant in districts and cities, which are often the bases of local political power. This phenomenon not only shows the dominance of political dynasties but also poses risks to the principles of competitive democracy, where the opportunities for independent candidates or new figures become increasingly limited. Additional research by Fitriyah (2020) revealed that dynastic politics has a negative impact on political regeneration and local leadership professionalism, which is often based on kinship rather than competence.

This data shows that dynastic politics is not just a phenomenon in one or two regions but has become a common practice in regional elections in Indonesia. Even at the provincial level, the majority of regions have candidates related to political dynasties. This indicates that, in the context of local democracy in Indonesia, dynastic politics has become entrenched and is seen as an effective political strategy by political elites to maintain or expand their power. This phenomenon can be seen as a reflection of local political dynamics, where factors such as patronage, clientelism, and family influence still play a significant role in shaping public political preferences. Moreover, the high percentage of candidates from political dynasties may also suggest weaknesses in the political party recruitment and cadre system, where parties tend to rely on the popularity and family networks of political elites to win elections, rather than building a cadre system based on competence and achievement.

also fairly effective in winning electoral contests. These figures reflect the complexity of challenges in democratizing local governance, where familial ties and established political networks often carry more weight than policy platforms or candidate competencies. This phenomenon also suggests the potential for power to become concentrated within a few elite families or groups across regions, posing a threat to democratic principles such as equal opportunity and power rotation.

The prevalence of dynastic politics may significantly affect efforts to improve professionalism and bureaucratic neutrality at the regional level. When elected regional leaders have strong ties to political dynasties, there is a risk that appointments and promotions in the bureaucracy will be based more on personal relationships or political loyalty than on competence and merit. This can hinder bureaucratic reform efforts aimed at creating a professional and capable civil service. Bureaucratic neutrality may also be compromised, as officials appointed through dynastic connections may feel obligated to serve the interests of the dynasty rather than the broader public good. Moreover, the dominance of dynastic politics can create an environment that discourages innovation and reform in governance, as there is a tendency to maintain a status quo that benefits the ruling dynasty. Sakila & Khaidir (2024) they explain, that bureaucratic reform efforts must include improvements to the recruitment system and competency-based job rotation in order to foster a reform spirit that demands integrity, accountability, and competence in public service delivery.

One of the negative impacts of dynastic politics on bureaucracy is the potential for bureaucratic politicization. When elected regional heads are related to political elites or former heads of regions, there is a tendency to use power to safeguard dynastic interests. This practice often manifests in the placement of relatives, loyalists, or politically affiliated individuals into strategic bureaucratic positions without serious consideration of competence, experience, or performance. Such politicization extends beyond top positions and may infiltrate middle and even lower levels of government structures (Solihah, 2019). This practice not only undermines the merit system in recruitment and promotion but can also create conflicts of interest and hinder innovation in public service delivery (Rakhmawanto, 2020). As a result, decision-making and resource allocation may become distorted, with dynastic interests taking precedence over public interests.

Furthermore, this can foster a culture of nepotism and favoritism in the bureaucracy, ultimately demoralizing competent civil servants who lack political connections.

In addition, dynastic politics can disrupt efforts to create a neutral bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, which is supposed to serve the public and implement policies objectively, may become a political tool for maintaining dynastic power (Hady, 2018). In this context, civil servants, who should uphold the principles of neutrality and professionalism, often face ethical dilemmas and systemic pressures to support or even implement policies and programs designed specifically to benefit the ruling dynasty. These pressures may take various forms, from direct instructions by high-ranking officials to subtle yet effective systems of incentives and disincentives that influence bureaucratic behavior. As a result, administrative decision-making objectivity may be compromised, public resource allocation may become biased, and public services may prioritize dynastic interests over the broader public welfare.

This condition not only hinders the implementation of good governance principles such as efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and participation but also has the potential to erode public trust in the integrity of the bureaucracy and the legitimacy of regional governments as a whole. In the long run, this erosion of trust can lead to political apathy among the public, reduce citizen participation in the local democratic process, and potentially create socio-political instability if public dissatisfaction accumulates to a critical point. Therefore, systematic and continuous efforts are needed to strengthen checks and balances mechanisms, enhance transparency in the recruitment and promotion of civil servants, and build a culture of integrity within the bureaucracy that can resist political dynastic pressures.

However, the impact of dynastic politics on bureaucracy is not always negative. Some studies show that in certain cases, dynastic politics can bring stability and policy continuity that benefits the region. This stability can be a valuable asset, especially in regions previously affected by political instability or frequent leadership changes. Policy continuity resulting from dynastic leadership can enable the implementation of long-term programs that require sustained commitment, such as major infrastructure projects or educational system reforms. Moreover, if elected dynasty members are competent and committed to public service, they can leverage family knowledge and experience to improve bureaucratic quality (Geys & Smith, 2017). A better understanding of policy

which involves the use of information and communication technology in governmental processes, facilitates faster, more accurate, and more accessible delivery of public information and services (Prihartono & Tuti, 2023). The BPKAD website functions as an integrated platform managing various administrative and financial aspects of local governance. Both systems act as oversight mechanisms that can minimize the misuse of power and resources by groups linked to political dynasties. For instance, through e-governance, the procurement of goods and services can be conducted online and transparently, thereby reducing opportunities for manipulation and collusion (Sumaya, 2024). Meanwhile, BPKAD enhances the accuracy of budget tracking and reporting, making it more difficult for public officials to misuse funds for personal or group interests (Khairi, 2022).

The BPKAD website displays a range of financial information, including documents such as the Regional Government Work Plan (RKPD), Strategic Plan (RENSTRA), Budget Work Plan (RKA), Budget Implementation Document (DPA), and financial reports of regional enterprises (BUMD), among others. In some regions, the BPKAD website also provides access to local budget-related regulations, such as Draft Regional Budget Regulations (RAPBD), Enacted Regional Budget Regulations (Perda APBD), and Regional Head Regulations (Perbup APBD).

With an open and integrated information system, the public can directly access governance and public service management information, helping to prevent nepotism and other irregularities often associated with dynastic political cultures. Transparency promoted through e-governance tools like BPKAD enables civil society and media to monitor regional government performance more effectively. This encourages greater public participation in decision-making processes and enhances the accountability of public officials. Furthermore, such systems can assist in standardizing administrative processes and public services, reducing the excessive discretionary authority often exploited in dynastic politics (Khairi, 2022).

However, the effectiveness of implementing e-governance and the BPKAD website to improve regional financial transparency and efficiency in dynastic political regions still faces multiple challenges. A major issue is the lack of adequate human resources and information technology infrastructure in such areas. Moreover, the deeply rooted paternalistic political culture in dynastic environments often poses a significant barrier to

establishing transparent and accountable governance (Guritno et al., 2019). Therefore, a more comprehensive approach is necessary one that not only involves developing e-governance systems like the BPKAD website, but also focuses on enhancing human resource capacity and strengthening mechanisms for community-based social oversight (Wardani & Subekti, 2021). These efforts aim to shift public perception away from viewing the government negatively.

To improve the effectiveness of e-governance and the BPKAD website in regions dominated by dynastic politics, collaboration and synergy among various stakeholders are essential. These include the central government, local governments, legislative bodies, civil society organizations, the media, and academic institutions. The central government can contribute by formulating supportive policies and regulations for the implementation of e-governance and BPKAD systems, as well as by providing technical support and mentoring to regions in need. Legislative institutions can play a role in monitoring and ensuring accountability in government and public service management. Meanwhile, civil society organizations, the media, and academics can serve as government partners in promoting transparency, encouraging public participation, and strengthening social control (Mendoza et al., 2022).

CONCLUSION

Dynastic politics, a deeply rooted phenomenon in our political system, has posed significant obstacles to the realization of governance based on the principles of good governance. This study reveals the trends, various forms, and adverse impacts of dynastic politics on government administration, particularly at the regional level where it severely hinders bureaucratic reform, fosters social inequality, and undermines both service quality and public trust. However, amidst the challenges posed by political dynasties, there emerges a glimmer of hope through technological advancements. The implementation of e-governance platforms, such as those provided by the Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency (BPKAD), holds considerable potential as a safeguard against corrupt and nepotistic practices often associated with dynastic politics. With increased transparency, citizens are empowered to monitor public spending and contribute to the creation of a more accountable government. The greatest challenge now

lies in ensuring that these technologies are accessible to all segments of society, including those in remote areas, and that they are utilized to their fullest potential.

The practical implications of these findings highlight the importance of strengthening merit-based recruitment and promotion systems to prevent the politicization of bureaucracy. Furthermore, fostering cross-sector collaboration among central and regional governments, civil society organizations, the media, and academic institutions is essential to building a transparent and accountable governance system. Regulatory oversight of political parties must also be reinforced to ensure that the selection of regional leadership candidates is based on competence rather than kinship ties. To move beyond descriptive analysis and offer strategic direction for the future, this study recommends several avenues for further research: field-based empirical studies, particularly in regions dominated by political dynasties, to explore public perceptions, levels of trust, and the effectiveness of e-governance implementation; comparative analyses across regions to assess differences in financial governance and bureaucratic performance between dynastic and non-dynastic administrations; and longitudinal studies to evaluate the long-term impact of dynastic politics on the quality of local democracy and regional development.

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