Where is the Force?: Mismatches and Contradictions with Post-Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation Task Forces

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Abstract

The Philippines frequently experiences natural disasters and occasionally man-made ones. As such, Republic Act No. 10121, also known as the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, provides designated lead agencies to respond to different stages of disaster management. Despite this, the Philippine government has resorted to the creation of inter-agency task forces (IATFs) to deal with these disasters. These task forces were designed to expedite the implementation of rehabilitation programs and projects. However, in the cases of Task Force Yolanda and Task Force Bangon Marawi, the completion of such programs for typhoon Yolanda and Marawi siege affected areas has been delayed tremendously despite the presence of IATFs. Through an assessment on the effectiveness of the IATFs’ clusters using the multiple case study approach, this paper aims to determine whether or not IATFs were necessary for the recovery and rehabilitation phase of Typhoon Yolanda and the Marawi siege. Upon carrying out the assessment, the lack of timeliness and planning of rehabilitation programs, inconsistencies in the NEDA and OCD reports, insufficient community participation, and the mismatch of services and needs were observed. As such, this paper recommends the creation of criteria for the selection of task force leadership along with other measures that can increase the government’s transparency and accountability through periodical auditing and encourage community participation in rehabilitation initiatives.

Keywords: Typhoon Yolanda; Marawi Siege; inter-agency task force; recovery and rehabilitation

Introduction

The Philippines was ranked one of the seven countries most vulnerable to extreme natural disasters according to the World Risk Report (Reuters, 2017). Located within the Pacific Ring of Fire, the country experiences a plethora of disasters. Typhoons are the most common, with the country experiencing an average of 20 typhoons annually (Ong, 2016). One of the most notable damaging typhoons is Typhoon Haiyan, which has sustained winds of 196mph and 8.5 - 9.1 meter storm surges, leaving 6,300 dead and 1,000 missing (Singer, 2014). It damaged a total of 1.14 million houses, displaced 5.13 million individuals, and cost the country PHP 9.95 billion in damages (Gonzales, 2020).

The country also experiences man-made disasters in the form of armed conflicts. As of 2019, several active ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups are present in the country, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Ansar al-Khalifa Philippines (AKP), and the Maute Group (U.S. Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2019). However, the most notable armed conflict is the Marawi Siege of 2017. During the battle between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and IS-affiliated militants, 98% of Marawi’s total population, or around 350,000 individuals, were forced to evacuate the battlegrounds while the city was bombed to ruins. More than 1,000 civilians and combatants were killed during the conflict, and an estimate of PHP18.5 billion was incurred in damages (Gong and Trias, 2020).
To respond to such disasters, the Philippine Congress passed the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, which formed the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), a coordinating body charged with handling the formulation, execution, supervision, and evaluation of DRR functions. The law also specifies agencies involved in preparing and executing rehabilitation and recovery management programs.

In the Philippines, post-disaster rehabilitation and recovery efforts for major disasters, both natural and man-made, are often assigned to task forces despite the existence of the NDRRMC. As authorized by Executive Order (EO) No. 292, s. 1987, Article VII, Section 17, the President organizes a task force composed of various agencies to prioritize and streamline the accomplishment of disaster management plans. However, post-disaster rehabilitation and recovery remain slow despite creating such tailor-fit inter-agency teams. Both Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) and the Inter-Agency Task Force Yolanda (IATF-Yolanda) have yet to fully accomplish sectoral goals, although years have passed since the occurrence of the Marawi Siege and Typhoon Yolanda, respectively (Parrocha, 2020; Kabagani, 2021). As such, affected citizens are unable to fully recover from the impact of the disaster; access to housing and settlement, livelihood and business development, physical infrastructure, and social services, among others, remain impaired (Meniano, 2020; Kabagani, 2022a). This paper examined the slow post-disaster rehabilitation and recovery despite the creation of the two aforementioned task forces.

**Principles of Recovery and Rehabilitation**

According to Labadie (2008), justice and equity are principles that should be upheld when planning and implementing recovery and rehabilitation projects as hazards after disasters have different impacts among socio-economic groups. Rehabilitation projects have the potential to redistribute the benefits, especially to the most affected and marginalized. Aside from these, Shaw (2014) also enumerates some core principles that can guide the success of rehabilitation. These include individual and family empowerment; leadership and local primacy; pre-disaster recovery planning; partnerships and inclusiveness; public information; unity of effort; timeliness and flexibility; resilience and sustainability; and psychological and emotional recovery. It is important to note that these principles are more of a guide to help implementers move in the right direction rather than serving as the building blocks of a concrete implementation plan. Not all principles are made equal, with some being more important than others. It would be helpful to introduce these principles based on their level of importance from a national perspective when coming up with rehabilitation plans. An example would be the importance of unity of effort and leadership and local primacy in ensuring the success of rehabilitation on a grander scale over psychological and emotional recovery (Shaw, 2014).

Moreover, Labadie (2008) mentioned that with full recovery commonly achieved within the span of 10 to 15 years, successful rehabilitation is achieved through learning-by-doing processes or continuous improvement. To determine which aspects of the project require improvement, periodic evaluations or auditing are required. Auditing brings various advantages, especially when it comes to transparency which is vastly important in protecting reputations. It was established in the survey by The Economist’s Intelligence Unit on 269 businesses that “reputational” risk was the most significant threat to a firm’s wellbeing, and there is no doubt that the same can be said for government entities and non-government organizations (Labadie, 2008). Transparency brought about by auditing would greatly help in managing this risk and it would also drastically increase the faith and confidence of the stakeholders of disaster-stricken communities in the task forces which are elected by the government. Moreover, auditing can also help determine whether the financial information is reliable and whether operations are performed efficiently and effectively. These are achieved through financial statement audits and performance audits (Labadie, 2008).
Labadie (2008) also recommended that both audits on the process and output of the project be done after its completion and by an independent external auditor. It would also be more effective if specific projects are being evaluated rather than the entire program while assessing these with “efficiency, results, timing, the quality of the product, pertinence, acceptability, strategy, scope, impacts/objectives, and external aspects.” Through this, not only is quality control for project outputs assured but accountability to the affected communities is assured well.

Issues in Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation

The post-disaster recovery process is quick when carried out by a single agency in a centralized manner. In contrast, the process slows down when collaboration between various stakeholders is involved (Shaw, 2014). However, speed does not necessarily translate into building back better; thus, the quality of outputs must also be given equal, if not the utmost importance. Considering this, effective management and coordination are critical to recovery processes, yet this poses a challenge for countries to achieve. In fact, a study by Safapour et al. (2021) indicates ineffective management and coordination along with insufficient financial resources as some of the most pervasive barriers in disaster recovery. These ultimately cause an increase in errors during the reconstruction process, thereby driving up costs and triggering schedule delays (Safapour et al., 2021). Even so, such issues are ultimately still tied to community participation and social capital (Li & Tan, 2019). Although leadership systems and recovery processes remain the same throughout disaster-affected communities, communities that have stronger cohesion with relevant stakeholders have more potential in having effective recovery efforts (Shaw, 2014).

Post-Disaster Task Forces

The ineffectiveness of disaster management in the Philippines is observed in the Typhoon Yolanda disaster. The IATF-Yolanda was only created in 2017 through an Administrative Order (AO) after the government recognized the need for a more coordinated effort among government agencies (AO 3 s. 2017). Prior to the creation of the IATF-Yolanda, the government relied on its disaster management plan in responding to disasters. Findings of Santiago, et al. (2016) show that although the government complied with its plan, it still failed to conduct effective relief operations during the early stages of the Typhoon Yolanda disaster, as it was overly reliant on national agencies. Thus, local and foreign organizations had to step in to fill the gaps left by the government.

Furthermore, even government officials have expressed reservations about the effectiveness of the NDRRMC. They cite that it cannot handle extremely destructive calamities, and Cabinet members must instead be directly involved to ensure timely execution. Task forces are created to involve multiple agencies to enable urgent action for multifaceted issues. Since a single official spearheads the task force, this also establishes a chain of command. In general, task forces implement policies specifically designed to make coordination more efficient, thus expediting processes. However, it is notable that task forces are often composed of agencies represented in the NDRRMC (Ranada, 2020; Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2020; Gregorio, 2020).

Establishing inter-agency coordination such as a task force allows ease of information sharing necessary for facilitating a successful emergency response (Smith, 2006). In addition, activities and power delegations between various government agencies overlap. Therefore, to improve the decision-making and efficiency of these agencies, coordination and interagency consultations are necessary (Administrative Conference of the United States, 2012).

Bearing in mind the benefits of inter-agency coordination encourages presidents and leaders to establish task forces to improve and ensure the welfare of the State. An example would be when President Obama created the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force by virtue of an executive order to coordinate the goals of long-term rebuilding plans against the onslaught of Hurricane Sandy, which include addressing economic conditions, the current infrastructure state, and identifying the requirements and resources for rebuilding efforts. The Task Force adopts the lessons learned during the previous disasters, and long-term rebuilding must begin simultaneously
with the response operations. The Task Force collaborates with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other public and private stakeholders to promote recovery in a unified manner while ensuring that their plans are consistent with the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) principles. (U.S Department of Housing and Development, 2012).

**Methods**

*Research Design*

The researchers utilized a qualitative method of research, specifically a multiple case-study. According to Baxter & Jack (2008), a multiple case-study is appropriate when a study is dealing with more than a single case to understand a certain phenomenon. They further discuss that this type of research allows the researchers “... to analyze within each setting and across settings”. This method is appropriate in this research because two cases were observed: (1) IATF-Yolanda and (2) TFBM in the rehabilitation and recovery of their respective jurisdictions. Baxter & Jack (2008) further explains that a multiple case-study is advantageous because it can provide strong and reliable data since data is drawn from the comparisons of more than one case. However, it is not without flaws. Heale & Twycross (2008) asserts that case studies involve large volumes of data that may be difficult to organize and analyze. As such, the researchers limited their study’s focus to the area of rehabilitation and recovery only.

*Data Gathering Procedure*

Data was collected from secondary sources to build up the case studies. The sources included are laws, legal documents, government documents, published journals, books, and newspaper articles.

*Data Analysis*

The purpose, composition, and alignment with the law of the selected task forces were evaluated by applying a comprehensive review of the literature. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the said task forces was assessed by focusing on the progress made by the clusters under the task forces.

*Evaluation Criteria of Task Forces*

The Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Recovery Framework for Typhoon Yolanda and the Marawi Siege are tailored according to the General Framework for Post-Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery. IATF-Yolanda is composed of five clusters, namely Housing and Resettlement, Infrastructure, Livelihood and Business Development, Social Services, and Support. Similarly, TFBM has all the said clusters, except for Support. Instead, TFBM has Local Governance and Peace Building and Land Resource Management. The Public Governance Theory was applied to identify whether or not the task forces were able to exhibit the 4 principles of the theory namely, cooperation, public participation, problem-solving, and openness. First, cooperation in disaster management refers to collaboration between various parties from diverse backgrounds. As such, effective cooperation requires cultural sensitivity and mutual understanding from the parties involved (Waugh & Streib, 2006). In emergency situations, an effective response usually calls for interagency cooperation (Moynihan, 2009). Second, public participation in disaster management includes governments, business, and civil society organizations. Further, the government facilitates the participation of local governments, nonprofit organizations, and various public services. The interaction of these actors promotes shared responsibility, transparency, and awareness (Nkombi & Wentink, 2022). Third, problem-solving refers to the governing body’s ability to efficiently manage and utilize resources to create worthwhile outcomes (Felin & Zenger, 2014). Lastly, openness is the level of accessibility on data and information needed to adequately assess the performance of the government (Rauf, 2021). By making information more publicly available, people are further encouraged to be involved in government processes (Rauf, 2021).
The theory also indicates the importance of consensus among the participants over governance due to official authority as it enables shared responsibility and includes diverse perspectives (Kim and Sohn, 2017). Focusing entirely on authority-driven initiatives hinders the capacity of the communities to participate in the recovery and improve their resiliency (Comfort, 1999). In order to evaluate these, the researchers used the summative evaluation method derived from the Guidelines on Evaluation in the National Government (Chua and Avisado, 2020).

Legal Framework

According to Republic Act (RA) 10121, disasters are “...a result of the combination of: the exposure to a hazard; the conditions of vulnerability that are present; and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce or cope with the potential negative consequences...”. Furthermore, hazards are defined as dangerous phenomena, substances, human activity, or conditions that may cause loss of life, injury, or other impacts, among others. To address these, RA 10121 institutionalized the NDRRMC, “…a body empowered with policy-making, coordination, integration, supervision, monitoring and evaluation functions...” relevant to Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM). This includes prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

The RA also defines disaster recovery and rehabilitation. Post-disaster Recovery refers to restoring appropriate facilities, livelihood, and living conditions with disaster risk reduction in mind to build back better. Meanwhile, rehabilitation refers to efforts to ensure the ability of affected communities to return to normal functioning through livelihood and infrastructure initiatives, among others. National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), as the Vice-Chairperson for Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery, spearheads such efforts nationwide and regionally. However, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (ARMM RDRRMC) is chaired by the regional chairperson (RA 10121, Sec. 10).

IRR of RA 10121

The IRR of RA 10121, also known as the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, “…provide for the development of policies and plans and the implementation of actions and measures pertaining to all aspects of disaster risk reduction and management...These apply to all levels of government, civil societies, private sectors, and all other DRM stakeholders”. Essentially, the IRR implements the RA by tasking the National Council to create the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework (NDRRMF), institutionalize the NDRRM plan, and appropriate necessary funds.

The NDRRMF highlights “the paradigm shift towards a proactive and preventive approach to disaster management.” It emphasizes that the effectiveness of disaster management would be further improved by achieving sustainable development with the help of “a bottom-up participatory process, enhanced level of awareness, strengthened multi-stakeholder partners, ..., pooling of resources”, and the build back better principle. However, this can only be made possible through streamlining Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation on both a national and local level. By doing so, the potential impact of disasters is mitigated and in return, reduces mortality rates and damages (ADRC, n.d.).

The NDRRMC-approved Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan details the post-disaster rehabilitation and recovery framework. Relevant bodies may tailor fit this depending on the disaster context. For example, these may be composed of sub-committees addressing specific sectoral issues such as infrastructure, shelter, social services, livelihood, and resource mobilization, among others. Each sub-committee will be assigned a lead and member agency from relevant government agencies, government-owned and controlled corporations, and the like (NEDA, 2019).

In addition to the foregoing, RA No. 11054 details the ARMM to Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) transition, highlighting the BARMM’s increased autonomy from the national government. In
terms of DRRM, a Bangsamoro DRRM Council (BDRRMC), established and led by the Chief Minister, handles post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation in cooperation with the national government.

Last, the 1987 Constitution grants the President power to execute laws. A manifestation of this is the President’s control over the executive branch. EO 292, s. 1987, Article VII, Section 17, specifies that “The President of the Philippines has the mandate of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This includes restructuring, reconfiguring, and appointments of their respective officials.” For example, the President may implement policies by establishing task forces - combining select agencies under one unit and appointing its head. This is applicable to post-disaster response, as the President may prioritize and streamline the accomplishment of disaster management plans via task forces.

Implementation
Marawi Siege (AO No. 3, and No. 9, Series of 2017)
Through AO 3, series of 2017, The TFBM was created and was initially chaired by the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND). It is responsible “… to take charge of a comprehensive and integrated rehabilitation program for Marawi City and other affected localities” (AO 9, series of 2017). Following Marawi City’s liberation, AO 9 was signed to amend AO 3. The amendments reflect the government’s current priority of rebuilding and developing the areas affected by the Marawi siege. Aligned with this, the chairperson of the task force was changed to the Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC).

Typhoon Yolanda (AO No. 5, Series of 2017)
On the other hand, after four years, the rehabilitation and recovery response for the Yolanda victims has still not achieved its initial goals. Thus, AO 5 was signed by President Duterte on August 8, 2017. This created the IATF-Yolanda to unify the government and involved agencies and facilitate the completion of projects and programs stated in the Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation Recovery Plan (YCRRP). As amended, Section 6 of AO 5 provides that the Task Force may issue the pertinent IRR, including specific guidelines, flowcharts, and timelines. Upon issuance of AO 5, Memorandum Order 62 (s. 2013) and 79 (s. 2015) signed by President Aquino of the past administration were repealed. The IATF-Yolanda was supposed to be terminated by 2020. However, the Yolanda Permanent Housing Program (YPHP), one of the major rehabilitation programs, and other rehabilitation and recovery activities are yet to be completed. Thus, President Duterte issued AO 33 to extend the term of IATF-Yolanda to June 30, 2022, adding two more years from the original dissolution of the task force.

Table 1. Comparison of NDRRMC and Task Force Bangon Marawi Composition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>NDRRMC</th>
<th>TFBM</th>
<th>Membership Agency Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Established as an entity for policy making, coordination, implementation, supervision, and evaluation of DRR functions (RA 10121, 2010)</td>
<td>Established to meet the requirements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) through quick response teams</td>
<td>HUDCC: Ensure the achievement of project objectives, oversee and control operations, and supervision of the NHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Chairperson: Secretary of DND</td>
<td>Chairperson: Chairman of HUDCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chairperson: Director-General of NEDA (RA No. 10121, 2010)</td>
<td>Vice Chairpersons: Secretary of DND and Secretary of DPWH (AO No. 9, 2017)</td>
<td>DND: Submission of monthly reports to the President (AO No. 9, 2017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership Agencies</td>
<td>AFP, CHED, Climate Change Office of the CCC, DA, DBM, DepED, DOE, DENR, DOF, DFA,</td>
<td>AFP, DBM, DepEd, DOE, DOH, DICT, DILG, DOST, DSWD, DTI, DOTr,</td>
<td>DPWH: Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HUDCC: Housing &amp; Resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DSWD &amp; DOH: Health and Social Welfare</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Comparison of NDRRMC and IATF-Yolanda Composition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NDRRMC Rationale</th>
<th>IATF-Yolanda Rationale</th>
<th>Membership Agency Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Established as an entity for policy making, coordination, implementation, supervision, and evaluation of DRR functions (RA 10121, 2010)</td>
<td>Establish a coordinating body for government agencies to ensure efficiency and effectivity in expediting rehabilitation projects</td>
<td>Chairperson: Cabinet Secretary Co-Chairpersons: Presidential Assistant for the Visayas and Presidential Assistant for Special Concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson: Secretary of DND Vice Chairperson: Director-General of NEDA (RA No. 10121, 2010)</td>
<td>To prevent delays similar to previous efforts (AO No. 5, 2017)</td>
<td>Cabinet Secretary: Provide secretariat support to the task force, ensure timeliness of project execution, and monitor impacts of annual performance and project roadmap targets and realign targets when necessary (AO No. 5, 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHED, DA, DBM, DepEd, DOE, DENR, DOF, DFA, DOH, DOJ, DPWH, DOLE, DOT, DOTC, DHI, Executive Secretary, GSIS, HUDCC, LCP, LMP, LPP, LMB, NAPCVCDC, NCRFW, PhilHealth, PNP, PNRC, Press Secretary, OPAPP, SSS, ULAP, four (4) representatives from the CSOs, one (1) representative from the private sector, and administrator of the OCD (RA No. 10121, 2010)</td>
<td>CHED, DA, DBM, DepEd, DENR, DILG, DPWH, DSWD, DTI, HUDCC, LRA, LWUA, NDRRMC, NEDA, NEA, NHA, NIA, and PCA (AO No. 5, 2017)</td>
<td>DPWH: Infrastructure HUDCC: Housing &amp; Resettlement DSWD: Social Services DTI: Business &amp; Livelihood DBM: Funding the Task Force (NEDA, 2014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R.A. 10121 states that the NDRRMC is a policy-making body assigned to develop the NDRRMF that will serve as the basis of any disaster risk reduction and management plans. The framework should be “comprehensive, all-hazards, multi-sectoral, inter-agency and community-based approaches.” In addition, they are expected to ensure that the NDRRMP is consistent with the NDRRMF. Moreover, the leadership of the NDRRMC is headed by the Secretary of DND and assigned NEDA as vice-chairperson for rehabilitation and recovery. This shows the consistency with the YCRRP being initiated by NEDA and further verified and assessed by the Office of Civil Defense.
(OCD). However, the RA only facilitates the plans for DRRM and does not include provisions on appointing agencies who shall spearhead or become members of the plan.

It is important to note that RA No. 10121 is not applicable to BARMM. With the implementation of RA No. 11054, ARMM transitioned to BARRM, an autonomous entity, and created its own separate RDRRMC called the BDRRMC. Based on section 9 of the Bangsamoro Administrative Code, BDRRMC is spearheaded by the chief minister, while the Bangsamoro Planning and Development Authority (BPDA) is assigned as Vice-Chair for Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation. On the other hand, under RA No. 10121, NEDA shall spearhead national and regional disaster rehabilitation and recovery efforts where the RDRRMCs’ vice-chairpersons are the regional directors of NEDA. Considering the differences in the delegation of authority, the Bangsamoro Administrative Code is not in line with RA No. 10121.

In the TFBM, BARMM participates in rehabilitation projects only as a board of director of Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) (MinDA, 2014). However, TFBM’s current structure is inconsistent with Section 8 of RA 11054 and with RA 10121, both of which state that BARMM is responsible for the rehabilitation of calamity-affected areas. This means that TFBM’s chairperson should be the chief minister of BARMM rather than the HUDCC, and its structure should comply with the framework made by the BDRRMC. As of May 2021, BARM has only established the MRP to complement the efforts of TFBM, rather than taking over the rehabilitation efforts entirely (Abubakar-Jocson, 2021). Similarly, IATF-Yolanda’s leadership is also inconsistent with the NDRRMC structure in RA 10121 (Appendices Table 1). The Cabinet Secretary heads the task force as the functions of the inter-agency task force under AO 25 are transferred to the Office of the Cabinet Secretary as mandated by EO 99. Moreover, it was observed that the assignment of chairpersons is more arbitrary, based on the current needs at the time of the calamity. The members of both bodies vary since the NDRRMC is more distinct and permanent as they constantly need to propose and review disaster risk reduction and management plans. Meanwhile, task forces are mainly ad-hoc depending on the current needs of the affected area and victims.

Both task forces were made through administrative orders which are one of the powers of the president; however, the structures are not based on any laws, including the NDRRMC.

Results

After analyzing the progress of each cluster, poor problem solving in the majority of the clusters’ projects for both task forces is evident. For instance, both housing clusters had problems with the quality and procurement of construction materials, funding, planned time frame, location of infrastructure, and distribution of completed housing. For infrastructure, both task forces did not consult with the affected communities. For the livelihood sector, resources were unequally distributed and support initiatives are unsustainable. Across all the sectors, untimeliness in the completion of projects was a common theme, and a majority are attributed to the existing red tape in transactions. Housing, infrastructure, support, and land governance had issues with procuring the right permits, licenses, or raw materials or resolving disputes with land ownership. Some departments in certain clusters for IATF-Yolanda have completed all their target projects; however, the target schedules were unmet and there was still a delay of a few years.

Public participation is also lacking as most of the stakeholders who convened were members of the government and its agencies, while there was a noticeable lack of participation of the affected community. While the NDRRMF promotes community participation in disaster risk management, several sectors in both task forces lacked this in the recovery and rehabilitation process. Rather than empowering disaster-affected communities to take charge of their own recovery efforts, the overall process was primarily dominated by government agencies and their corresponding representatives. As a result, there has been a mismatch between the assistance provided and the actual needs of the community. If not, rehabilitation programs are not adequate and holistic enough to address
the concerns of victims affected by Typhoon Yolanda and the Marawi Siege. Without the involvement of the community, building back a better, resilient, and sustainable community remains a large challenge. The lack of recent updates and the inconsistency of reports suggest the possibility of issues on cooperation and openness. Task forces are responsible for submitting monthly reports to the President regarding their progress in the recovery and rehabilitation of Yolanda and Marawi victims. However, the reports provided by NEDA and OCD have been inconsistent with the responses of the people in the affected communities. Resettlement sites were reported to be completed but still lacked the basic necessities such as electricity and water. Reports also showed psychological support was given, but communities are still asking the administration to address their psychological needs. The sectoral goals and their corresponding targets also vary from one report to another. In addition, the monthly reports to the President have stopped being publicly available. As stated in the limitations, the latest data recovered from NEDA and OCD were from 2017.

Overall, consistency with the Public Governance theory was barely observed in the recovery and rehabilitation initiatives of both TFBM and IATF-Yolanda (refer to table 5 and 6). Based on the previous discussion, numerous disaster-affected communities have yet to establish a sustainable settlement where stable livelihood, reliable infrastructure, accessible social services, and disaster-resilient housing are all present. Without the principles of problem solving, public participation, cooperation, and openness, such goals are difficult to achieve.

Discussion

Housing and Resettlement

IATF-Yolanda’s cluster aims to relocate affected families in danger zones to safe areas and to develop secure, comprehensive, and sustainable settlements (GOVPH, n.d.). The findings of Qian et. al (2020) show that the YPHP is still constructing 49,112 housing units and energizing 122 permanent resettlement projects as of 2020. Although some units have been completed, the quality of these has been questioned. Tacloban Vice Mayor Yaokasin mentioned that the resettlement sites in Tacloban were under investigation because they were suspected to be constructed from substandard materials. He added that many of the units still lack pipe-in water supply. Due to such issues, many of the houses remain uninhabited and are rotting away (ABS-CBN News, 2021). The Commission on Audit (COA) called out the National Housing Authority (NHA) for its failure to meet its targets, especially since the NHA already has access to all the funds (Aurelio, 2021). The NHA admitted that it faced challenges, including looking for suitable resettlement sites that align with the build back better principle (Cailao, 2015). There were also issues with titling, securing permits, and non-compliance of developers with requirements, resulting in the termination of awarded contracts (Nicolas, 2022). Moreover, Qian et. al (2020) identified the lack of proper planning for funding and time mapping as another issue, resulting in funding gaps and low utilization rates.

TFBM’s cluster has two goals: to enable families to return to their original homes or find decent homes and to provide affected families financing to rebuild their houses (NEDA, 2019). As of 2022, 940 permanent housing units have been completed, while 2,700 units are in progress (Kabagani, 2022 b). Likewise, transitory shelters in 4 barangays have been completed (TFBM, 2022). While there are already resettlement sites, some were found to lack basic necessities. Some resettlement sites lacked water sanitation; concerns were expressed over the proximity of septic tanks to the lake table, as it made the area susceptible to diarrhea and cholera. Furthermore, there was a lack of stable electrification and delays in the installation of electric poles and cables (Fernandez, 2021). With regards to homeowners who have applied for building permits, only 865 out of 2,500 were granted by the OBO (Rosauro & Suson, 2022). The Moro Consensus Group (MCG) expressed that almost 100,000 families are yet to be permitted to return home (Lacorte, 2021). Thousands remain in shelters and housing projects, where essentials (sanitation and basic supplies) are lacking, and are yet to receive compensation for the damages to their properties (MindaNews, 2020). In light of this, SB No. 2420 has been approved and is waiting for the President’s signature (Rosauro & Suson, 2022). The bill “...aims to provide compensation for the loss or
destruction of private properties brought about by the five-month battle between government forces and Daesh-inspired terrorists” (PNA, 2022).

Infrastructure

IATF-Yolanda’s cluster aims to assess, rehabilitate and reconstruct public and private infrastructure based on improved disaster resiliency standards, excluding the distribution of water and electricity (NEDA, 2014). As of March 2017, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), National Irrigation Agency (NIA), National Power Corporation (NPC), and National Electrification Administration (NEA) have completed all their target projects, while other departments’ projects remain incomplete and outdated. Moreover, several projects targeted to finish during 2015 and 2016 had delays in their completion and procurements by one to two years.

There were also several inconsistencies in the NEDA reports, with some subcategories, target outputs, and completion information changing throughout the years (NEDA, 2017; DPWH, 2015). The IBON Foundation also noted that there were no informed public consultations between the LGUs and affected communities (Lim, 2018). The current administration’s Build, Build, Build (BBB) Program also prioritized tourism utilizing the completed projects of the Yolanda rehabilitation, such as the seawall, for the benefit of tourism establishments instead of communities. In fact, the fisherfolk had no access to NDZs, while several hotels were established there. Overall, the projects affected over 10,000 families from 46 barangays (Lim, 2018). One unintended result of the project is the increase in Eastern Visayas’s GRDP from 4.5% in 2013 to 12.4% in 2016. 44.5% due to the growth of the industry sector. However, 44.5% of the industry growth can be attributed to the rehabilitation project’s public and private constructions (IBON Foundation, 2017).

Table 3. IATF-Yolanda Completed and Ongoing Projects as of 2017 (NEDA, 2017; DPWH, 2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)</td>
<td>2214</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Irrigation Administration (NIA)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Power Corporation (NPC)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Electrification Administration (NEA)</td>
<td>7052</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Transportation (DOTr)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Food Authority (NFA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Education (DepEd)</td>
<td>13,510</td>
<td>1,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission on Higher Education (CHED)</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, TFBM’s cluster aims to reconstruct or rehabilitate public and private infrastructure facilities according to improved disaster resiliency standards. Marawi rehabilitation projects are expected to be 95% complete by June 3, 2022, with several projects already completed as of December 2021.

Table 4. TFBM Completed and Ongoing Projects (CVC, 2022 a: CVC, 2022 b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Completed Projects</th>
<th>Ongoing Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● 20 kilometers of transcentral roads</td>
<td>● 18 Barangay Complexes (with health center and madrasah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● 3 bridges</td>
<td>● 7 School Buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● PNP Community Police Action Center</td>
<td>● Sarimanok Sports Stadium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Marawi Fire Substation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TFBM also stated the inclusion of Civil Society Organizations (CSO) as third-party monitoring groups for transparency and regular inspections (Kabagani, 2022a). However, there have been several reports from different Maranao groups which were inconsistent with the progress reports of TFBM, indicating that there could be delays contrary to what TFBM claims. For instance, the 1st District of Lanao del Sur former representative claimed several barangay facilities and mosques were incomplete when TFBM announced 85% completion of projects (Gallardo, 2021). Additionally, several IDPs have expressed their disapproval for their lack of participation in decision-making for the projects while seeing the TFBM as outsiders from their faith, culture, identity, and society. Consequently, they view the city as being rebuilt not in accordance with culture and traditions (Galang, 2021). This could lead to an unintended result of increasing the risk of disruption of peace and political transition. Excluding the IDPs from rehabilitation projects could increase violent extremism and tension, especially amongst the youth. It could be perceived as a removal of their agency by the National Government and thus marginalizing the Maranaos (Auditor, 2020).

Livelihood and Business Development

IATF-Yolanda’s cluster aims to provide livelihood and emergency employment assistance to affected families (NEDA, 2014). As of 2016, 89.4% of survivors have had their fishing boats replaced or repaired, 85.7% of targeted rice and corn seed bags have been distributed to beneficiaries, and 80.22% of targeted entrepreneurship training has been completed (GOV.PH, 2016). However, fisherfolk were given more priority compared to farmers and other livelihood sectors. In NEDA’s 2016 progress report, “fishing gears and paraphernalia provided” exceeded target goals, whereas aid for coconut farmers was progressing slowly, with less than 30% of areas with coconut intercropping completed. Feedback from farmers also mentioned that government agencies lack the commitment to expedite rehabilitation programs in the coconut industry, and this was evident when timelines were not followed (Pormon et al., 2021). Despite the sectoral preference, there were cases wherein a fisherman or non-fisherman would each receive several boats (Eadie et al., 2020). Duplicate aid prevented other fisherfolk from receiving much needed assistance. This resulted in greater competition and fishing activity while a number of boats given to non-fisherfolk were left unused (Eadie et al., 2020). This threatened livelihood sustainability and wasted already limited resources. Additionally, survivors are struggling to find a long-term livelihood, given that their workplaces are distant from relocation sites and lack transportation funds (Garcia, 2021). Thus, failing to comply with RAY, which states that “resettlement plans must also ensure proximity to livelihood and basic social services.”

TFBM’s cluster has two goals: to restore sustainable incomes and to improve the local economy’s vitality (NEDA, 2019). The Philippine framework of post-disaster recovery indicates that livelihood programs and projects “...
should be appropriately set-up within two years after a disaster and should be empowering disaster-affected resettlements toward self-sufficiency” (Santiago, 2018). However, according to the Marawi-based Early Response Network, displaced residents are still unable to find a stable source of income as of June 2021. There are no available jobs, while government livelihood programs only accommodate a limited number of people (Guda, 2021). Even so, there is a mismatch between standard livelihood assistance and programs provided by DTI and the following: the pre-existing trader and consolidator social system in Marawi, the Maranao’s cultural context, and their interests (Fernandez, 2021). Although victims are given livelihood support along with other cash grants, these are not sufficient to sustain their basic necessities; therefore, they prefer to stay in their original settlements with better access to livelihood opportunities plus amenities (Philippines Humanitarian Country Team, 2019). Without sustainable income, victims also resort to borrowing money from their relatives, which produces other issues such as debt (Latip-Yusoph, n.d.).

**Social Services**

The IATF-Yolanda’s cluster, led by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), prioritized health security by providing medical programs and projects (DSWD, 2015). Various government and non-government agencies also provided psychosocial support to help residents cope with the trauma brought by the disaster (Bermejo, 2017). Through their program, Kalahi-CIDSS, they assisted families with their ESA by utilizing a community-driven development approach (DSWD, 2015). Based on NEDA’s 2016 update, the ESA targets to assist 1,032,655 families, with 1,038,671 families successfully assisted, while 42,197 families are still in the process of acquiring assistance. But because of the onslaught of Yolanda, the program prioritized recovery for accessing infrastructure sub-projects such as small roads, bridges, and pathways. Under this cluster, the DepEd also provided textbooks and learning materials for children. As of 2017, DepEd has completed its goals of providing a total of 339,745 learning kits and delivering copies of textbooks and learning materials that total 6,470,478. According to a local student in Tacloban, electricity is functional, and residents also have access to the internet. “Education is definitely back to normal” as students are able to participate in school activities (Gualberto, 2018.)

In addition, according to residents in relocation sites in Tacloban North, several new schools have been constructed, allowing students to attend classes in permanent classrooms in July 2020. However, the pandemic likely impacted the schooling of students.

TFBM aims to complete its rehabilitation by December 2021. As of October 2020, various assistance such as relief, health services, and psychosocial support was given to 49,785 displaced families. Amidst the pandemic, the construction of public facilities was completed, such as the PNP Community Police Action Center, the Marawi Fire Substation, a Maritime Outpost, Rorogagus Barangay Health Station with medical supplies, the Marawi Central Police Station, and a solar power irrigation system (DHSUD, 2022). In addition, six Islamic houses and a four-story school building were reconstructed. Despite several projects accomplished, there are still projects undergoing the procurement process such as hospitals (Gotinga, 2021). Moreover, according to some IDPs, families in transitional shelters have not yet been given basic services, such as electricity and water. At the same time, Samira Gutoc, chair of the Ako Bakwit, said in an interview that the social and psychological needs of the community have yet to be addressed (Galang, 2021), showing a contradiction between the reports and the sentiments of the people.

**Support**

The IATF-Yolanda cluster, led by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and NEDA, tackles financing, auditing, and program implementation, among others, to improve coordination among the IATF sub-committees (NEDA, 2019). The NDRRM Fund is disbursed among national agencies (Paragas et al., 2016). Bottlenecks are common, with processes averaging one year before funds are accessed (Villacin et al., 2017). Local governments cite that funding should have been flexible, as they know cheaper and more efficient methods (Paragas et al., 2016). In fact, local governments submitted plans earlier than national agencies (Monsod, 2016). Despite the
existence of the cluster, procedures delay the delivery of supplies and assistance (COA, 2014). Additionally, figures on fund utilization and reversion to the treasury are unreleased (Meniano, 2018). These expose red tape and transparency issues, which should have been addressed by the cluster (ABS-CBN TeleRadyo, 2021). These failings contribute to the public’s lack of trust and reliance on the government. Communities rely on I/NGOs instead (Atienza et al., 2018).

**Land Resource Management**
Overlapping land claims, lack of formal titles, discriminatory planning processes, and land-related conflicts plague Marawi (The World Bank, 2020; Fernandez et al., 2018). The TFBM cluster, led by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), addresses these by utilizing government-owned lands, improving access to land conflict settlement, and resolving issues on land ownership (NEDA, 2019). However, progress is slow, which intensifies the issues arising from the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) transition (International Alert, 2020). In 2020, 800 land disputes were expecting settlement by the Land Dispute Resolution Committee, a TFBM partner by 2022 (Mindanews, 2020). The signing of RA 11696, also known as the Marawi Siege Victims Compensation Act, provides victims some relief. Those who lost residential and commercial properties reparations based on land market value and replacement costs. However, situated in a backdrop where systemic issues such as lack of formal acknowledgment of traditional ownership claims, unilateral government expropriation, and looting and demolition cases remain, which drive rising clan feuds and extremist group conflicts, the effectiveness of government efforts is unclear (Fernandez, 2021). Should Marawi land management become more efficient and inclusive, it will reinforce BOL, a key to hastening peacemaking in the region. If not, violent deaths attributed to land conflicts will continue to increase (International Alert, 2020).

**Local Governance and Peacebuilding**
The TFBM cluster, led by the DND and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), aims to strengthen the rule of law in order to restore peace and order and address the causes of conflict (NEDA, 2019). The OPAPP, a member agency, spearheaded the decommissioning of around 12,000 MILF-BIAF combatants, Localized Peace Engagements, Social Healing and Peacebuilding Program, and PAMANA Program, among others (OPAPP PR, 2020). However, issues remain. Focusing on decommissioning combatants instead of the illegal weapons market, conflicting land claims, and the transition period of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority reflect deeply embedded issues (Lara, 2019; Franco, 2020). Compounded by the slow progress of TFBM, anger and dissatisfaction may motivate insurgent recruitment. This does not bode well, especially since Maute group remnants persist and recruitment activities are reportedly renewed (Fernandez, 2021).

**Table 5. IATF-Yolanda and the Four Key Principles of Public Governance Theory.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legend</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Governance Theory Principle is Observed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Governance Theory Principle is not Observed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Resettlement</td>
<td>Lack of interagency cooperation as projects regarding the resettlement sites are either suspected to be made from substandard materials or are still lacking basic necessities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Lack of interagency cooperation as some projects were built to benefit other entities rather than the affected communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood and Business</td>
<td>Victims cite the government’s lack of commitment to expedite recovery processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>DSWD led government agencies and NGOs to conduct health security programs and psychosocial support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Interagency leadership by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and NEDA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: TFBM and the Four Key Principles of Public Governance Theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Governance Theory Principle is Observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Governance Theory Principle is not Observed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

122
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Public Participation</th>
<th>Problem-solving</th>
<th>Openness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Resettlement</td>
<td>Lack of interagency cooperation as projects regarding the resettlement sites are still lacking basic necessities</td>
<td>The Moro Consensus Group is involved in the process and they expressed that almost 100,000 families are yet to be permitted to return</td>
<td>While there are already resettlement sites, some were found to lack basic necessities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Interagency collaboration led by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)</td>
<td>Several Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were allowed to enter as third-party monitoring groups for inspections</td>
<td>Land dispute issues delaying the construction process are being addressed through the Ministry of Human Settlements and Development’s (MHSD) land dispute committee rather than through the justice system’s lengthier process</td>
<td>Due to lack of public access to information such as figures on fund utilization and reversion, there is an increasing lack of public trust in the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood and Business Development</td>
<td>Maranos do not comply with resettlement programs due to limited access to livelihood opportunities in resettlement sites</td>
<td>Little or no consideration of Maranao culture in DTI programs</td>
<td>Livelihood support and cash grants are not enough to address the needs of victims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>Lack of interagency cooperation as projects regarding the reconstruction of hospitals needed for health services are still under the procurement process</td>
<td>The needs of the community are not met with the ongoing projects of the cluster</td>
<td>Basic services are still to be given to the victims as the rebuilding of infrastructures was prioritized</td>
<td>Due to lack of public access to information such as figures on fund utilization and reversion, there is an increasing lack of public trust in the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Resource Management</td>
<td>Interagency collaboration led by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)</td>
<td>Glaring lack of cultural sensitivity, as seen in the lack of formal acknowledgment of traditional ownership claims, unilateral government expropriation, and looting and demolition cases</td>
<td>While the cluster attempted to improve access to land conflict settlement and resolve issues on land ownership, progress is slow as disputes remain unresolved.</td>
<td>The slow progress amplifies the public’s lack of trust and dissatisfaction in the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governance and Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Interagency leadership by DND and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)</td>
<td>Public participation is encouraged through various programs.</td>
<td>While the cluster attempted to restore peace and order, its methods demonstrate a lack of understanding on addressing deeply-embedded issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions
Task forces were created to expedite the rehabilitation and recovery of disaster-torn Yolanda and Marawi. However, goals are unmet due to a lack of effective problem solving, public participation, cooperation, and openness strategies. Stakeholders are largely uninformed about actual project progress due to the lack of access to progress reports. In fact, communities are left out of disaster rehabilitation and recovery management, which has led to a mismatch between the initiatives provided and the community's actual needs.

Recommendations
The previous discussions exhibited the inadequacy of the TFBM and IATF-Yolanda in fulfilling their mandates. Based on the foregoing discussions, the paper recommends the following:

1. Creation of criteria for the selection of task force leadership. In light of the confusing assignment of leadership roles for the TFBM due to contradictions with RA 11054 and RA 10121; and IATF-Yolanda due to misalignment of its leadership with the NDRRMC structure as provided in RA 10121, criteria must be created to specify the parameters for selecting a task force leader. Factors including but not limited to expertise, experience, and communication skills must be considered to ensure the success of the task force.

2. Increase the government's transparency and accountability. The government has failed to provide the general public with timely and accurate progress reports. To push for increased transparency from the government, periodical auditing can be conducted. As Labadie (2008) recommended, auditing is preferably conducted after project completion; and the resulting transparency can assist in managing risks and restoring the affected communities' faith and confidence in the government and its agencies.

3. Encourage increased community participation in rehabilitation initiatives. The government agencies and their representatives were observed to have overtaken the disaster risk management initiatives, even though the NDRRMF encourages the participation of the community. While it is only appropriate for the government to lead the rehabilitation of Marawi, Tacloban, and other affected areas, the participation of other stakeholders, such as the community, must always be considered and even encouraged, as the Public Governance theory suggested. Shaw (2014) argued that the attainment of successful recovery efforts is heightened when communities have a stronger connection with relevant stakeholders. Amplifying the voices of the community would help in accurately providing them with their actual needs, not just their needs as perceived by the discerning eye of the government, which can sometimes be erroneous.

With regards to studies related to the same field, the researchers recommend the conduct of further studies that use a more quantitative approach in evaluating the progress of each of the task force's sub-committees. Since the present study focused on a qualitative approach to assessing the data, future researchers are encouraged to use the criteria stated in the ADB's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Public Sector Operations (Thomas, et al, 2016) or the NEDA, DBM, and UNDP's Guidelines on Evaluation in the National Government (Chua and Avisado, 2020). Both of these exhibit extensive criteria which are measurable using a rating scale. Using this approach can help achieve more data-specific results.

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survivors-continue


projects-near-completion-2015-ends


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