

## Strategy in Resolving the DI/TII Rebellion in Aceh in 1953-1959

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### ABSTRACT

The research, entitled Military Strategy in Resolving the DI/TII Rebellion in Aceh in 1953-1959, aims to (1) describe the implementation of any military strategy used in resolving the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh, (2) explain the impact of the enactment of military-assisted regions. (Militaire Bijstand) and the Application of the Conceptual Wise Principle to the settlement of the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh in 1953-1959. This study uses a qualitative approach with the help of historical methods. The data collection techniques were carried out through documentation, literature review, and interviews. The results obtained from this study are (1) The implementation of Military Assisted Regions (Militaire Bijstand) became the first strategy to be implemented by sending troops and armed equipment to secure conditions in Aceh, then the next military strategy was implemented called the Wise Principle Concept which became a new beginning for settlement of the rebellion in Aceh. The success of this conception was finally proven by the establishment of the Lamteh Pledge agreement, (2) Development after the completion of the DI/TII rebellion occurred from various sectors in Aceh.

Keywords: Military Strategy, Resolution, DI/TII Rebellion in Aceh.

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### ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk (1) Mendeskripsikan penerapan strategi militer apa saja yang digunakan dalam penyelesaian pemberontakan DI/TII di Aceh, (2) Menjelaskan dampak dari Pemberlakuan Daerah Berbantuan Militer (Militaire Bijstand) dan Penerapan Konsepsi Prinsipil Bijaksanaterhadap penyelesaian pemberontakan DI/TII di Aceh tahun 1953-1959. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan bantuan metode sejarah. Adapun teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan cara dokumentasi, tinjauan pustaka dan wawancara. Hasil yang diperoleh dari penelitian ini adalah (1) Pemberlakuan Daerah Berbantuan Militer (*Militaire Bijstand*) menjadi strategi pertama yang diterapkan dengan mengirim pasukan dan alat bersenjata untuk mengamankan kondisi di Aceh, kemudian strategi militer selanjutnya yang diterapkan bernama Konsepsi Prinsipil Bijaksana yang menjadi awal baru bagi penyelesaian pemberontakan di Aceh. (2) Pembangunan pasca penyelesaian pemberontakan DI/TII terjadi dari berbagai sektor di Aceh

Kata Kunci: Strategi Militer, Penyelesaian, Pemberontakan DI/TII di Aceh



## INTRODUCTION

The holding of the Round Table Conference in The Hague, was not the end of the struggle to establish oneself, but only changed the nature of the struggle. This condition is becoming increasingly complex considering that every region in Indonesia that has just become independent has its own interests that need to be fulfilled, requiring a different handling from the Republican Government. Likewise with Aceh which has special conditions as a different region compared to other regions in Indonesia, Aceh which is known to have a regional identity that is firmly committed to the principles of applying Islamic law in daily life, followed by a strong sense of nationalism that has been maintained since the sultanate. until Indonesian independence.

This condition became a supporting factor for the All Aceh Ulama Association to ask for the determination of the Aceh Province so that the regulations for implementing Islamic law could be implemented, this decision was finally approved by Syafruddin Prawiranegara, therefore Aceh became an independent province in 1949 and Tengku Daud Beureueh was appointed as the Governor. The determination is certainly a pride for the people of Aceh. However, this pride did not last long because the government again issued a new decision, namely PP No. 21 August 20, 1950 stipulates that Indonesia only consists of 10 provinces and Aceh is asked to merge and submit to the Province of North Sumatra (Amiruddin, 2008).

This disappointment made Tengku Daud Beureueh determined to join the Darul Islam movement and the Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII). After being convinced of the chosen decision, then on September 20, 1953, Tengku

Muhammad Daud Beureueh declared Aceh as part of the DI/TII rebellion .

After the declaration of rebellion became more widespread, the Republican Government, which was facing political turmoil in various parts of Indonesia, considered DI/TII a real threat and urgent action was needed to stop the rebellion which was growing very quickly , sending troops , guarding security, as well as seeking diplomacy by sending several state representatives starting from the Governor of North Sumatra, the Prime Minister, to the Vice President Hatta, but to no avail so the government immediately implemented a military strategy considering the developments experienced.

The military strategy offered in Aceh is certainly very different from the strategy offered to resolve the DI/TII rebellion in other areas, given the different backgrounds of the rebellion, region, and other conditions, the government also considers in carrying out the military strategy . The public in general only knew that the resolution of the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh was completed with the Lamteh Pledge, without knowing how long and complicated the process had to go through until the proposal to burn Aceh came up, if this rebellion did not succeed peacefully.

In resolving the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh, in this case a study is needed to raise the theme so that the younger generation can learn that every rebellion does not have to end in victory or defeat, but how the results of the rebellion can benefit both parties in conflict. Therefore, the author is very interested in studying this theme further by raising the title "Military Strategy in Resolving the DI/TII Rebellion in Aceh in 1953-1959".

## Literature Review

Military strategy as a form of provision that is used as a guide for the

Indonesian National Army (TNI) in carrying out its main tasks and role as a means of state defense with the task of upholding state sovereignty and maintaining the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) (Santoso, 2010).

Rebellion according to the KBBI comes from the word "rebel" which means struggling to break free, against not wanting to obey a power, the DII/TII rebellion that occurred in Aceh, is a form of disappointment that wants to fight the decision given by the government.

According to M. Nawawi, rebellion is a conflict between the government that arises because of differences in interests, in this view the government's policy of pursuing centralism through bureaucratization has led to disputes with Acehneese leaders who are fighting for their regional autonomy. the occurrence of a rebellion, while the Ulama-Uleebalang dispute was considered a side cause that arose as a result of the main problem (Sjamsuddin, 1990) . The government immediately launched a military strategy after the announcement of the revolt by Teungku Daud Beureuh on September 21, 1953, the strategy chosen to maintain the security of the Republic of Indonesia was alternated according to the political policies offered by the incumbent Prime Minister , bargaining which as an effort to diplomacy become military strategic steps to be implemented throughout Aceh in order to establish peace.

The DI/TII rebellion was motivated by several supporting factors, one of which was On December 17, 1949 the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia, which at that time was led by Deputy Prime Minister Syarifuddin Prawiranegara for his authority to make regulations in lieu of Law No. 8/Des/WKPM. The regulation aims to shape Aceh to become its own province and the appointment of Tengku Daud Beureuh to be appointed as the Governor of Aceh is no longer the military

governor of Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo. (Nirvana, 2007) . However, this happiness did not last long with further investigation and review, the results of which were very contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Acehneese people.

Even the decisions of the Central Government not only disturbed the leaders in Aceh, but also had an impact on the Acehneese people at large. From then on, until 1953, preparations against the Central government for its policies continued to be carried out by the leaders in Aceh by the PUSA group. the form of spreading ideology, doctrine, rhetoric raised up in the form of community organizing (Minarva & Bukhari, 2017)

## METHOD

The approach used in this research is a qualitative approach. Researchers will collect data by means of documentation , and interviews, so that they can reveal problems according to research needs. According to Maleong (2007:6) a qualitative approach is a research study to understand the phenomena that will be experienced by research subjects, for example behavior, perceptions, motivations, actions, and others, holistically and by means of descriptions in the form of words and language on a natural context and by utilizing natural methods. In this study, researchers used primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are original sources written by historians, while secondary sources are sources written by historians based on the first source (Firdaus et al., 2020) .

The research method used in this research is the historical method proposed by Kuntowijoyo. The historical method is the process of critically reviewing and analyzing records and relics of the past. Where in the historical method there are five stages, namely, (1) topic selection; (2) heuristics or source collection; (3) verification or source criticism (internal criticism and external criticism); (4) interpretation or interpretation; and (5) historiography or historical writing

(Kuntowijoyo, 1955) The use of the historical method in this research is because the researcher wants to examine the role of the military in resolving the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh.

### **Research Location and Time**

The location of this research is in Banda Aceh. In addition, to obtain research sources in the form of primary and secondary sources, researchers will visit several libraries in Banda Aceh, then conduct interviews with several historical actors or witnesses during the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh. The timing of this research took place from the start of proposal writing in June 2020.

### **Data Collection Technique**

The data collection technique used in this research is to use the following techniques:

Documentation is a technique of collecting data obtained from written data about the object of research that can be trusted and accounted for the truth. The documentation data referred to in this study are data obtained from archives related to the research topic. These data were obtained through the Library and Archives Service and the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia to find several archives containing government decrees regarding the issue of the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh which became the support for the success of this research.

Furthermore, the literature review is to look for written references from written works in the form of books, theses, and theses whose research can be accounted for. The libraries visited, namely the Ali Hasjmy Museum and Library, many books that are directly related to this research such as books written directly by the perpetrators and witnesses of the history of DI/TII in Aceh, the Library of the Aceh Cultural Value Preservation Center (BPNB), the Central Library of Documentation and Aceh Information (PDIA) which has a large

collection of rare books related to DI/TII in Aceh, the Syiah Kuala University Library and the Syiah Kuala University Faculty of Teacher Training and Education Library.

An interview is a meeting of two people to exchange information and ideas through question and answer, so that they can construct meaning in a particular topic (Sugiyono, 2007). The interview technique aims to obtain research sources from historical actors or people close to the object of research. With the aim of obtaining explanations and also avoiding misunderstandings, thus obtaining additional information from the lack of written information. In this study, the interview procedure was carried out with two informants, namely Mr. M. Saleh or better known as Mr. Itam who is a former member of DI/TII who is now a retired TNI, he was appointed to the TNI in 1957. Then the second resource person was Mrs. Marliah Usman Nyak Gade who is the biological son of Usman Nyak Gade who was also reassigned to Aceh with Syamaun Gaharu.

### **Data Analysis Technique**

Data analysis is the process of compiling the data obtained so that they can be interpreted. The data is then processed by selecting relevant data, discussing, and then concluding. This discussion is analyzed with a qualitative approach to the object of study. The steps used in this data analysis technique are as follows.

Source Verification or Criticism According to (Laksono, 2018) the verification stage is a process where researchers will sort and select and determine which sources can be used. In other words, source criticism is an attempt to get the authenticity and credibility of sources that can be accounted for so as to produce actual facts.

After all the data obtained, in the next process, source criticism is carried out for each data that has been collected, so for the first time the researcher will test the

truth of the sources obtained from the results of documentation, literature review and interviews. Tests carried out later will ensure the authenticity and credibility of sources that can be accounted for in their writing.

Interpretation is an attempt to interpret historical facts within the framework of the reconstruction of past realities, by providing relations between historical facts as evidence of anything that has happened in the past, interpreted by looking for evidence of their relationship to one another, thus forming a series of events. factual and logical meaning of past lives (Daliman, 2015) . Data that has been criticized through critique of sources whose credibility is recognized, will then be analyzed in this study, interpretation or data analysis has the main activity of describing the facts that have been found and then assembled into a single unit, so that in the end it produces conclusions.

Historiography or Writing After collecting data, criticizing, and analyzing, then proceed to the writing stage. The researcher will assemble the relevant research data to reconstruct it in written form, thus providing an explanation of the history of military strategy in resolving the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh in 1953-1959.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### The DI/TII Rebellion Erupts in Aceh

Indonesia was in a state of emergency when President Soekarno was arrested in the Second Dutch Military Aggression. At that time, the mandate was given to Prime Minister Syafruddin Prawiranegara to be the representative of the government and the government was moved to Bukit Tinggi. Not long ago, he was moved again to Kutaraja because only the Aceh region was safe from the Dutch military aggression that spread throughout Indonesia (Sjamsuddin, 1990) .

With the mandate given, Syafrudin Prawiranegara has the privilege to make regulations according to the force of law, but must be approved by the government

council. Given this opportunity, the All Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA) took the opportunity to propose granting provincial status to Aceh by expressing the intention that Aceh was lagging behind in the social and economic fields compared to other regional peers. For this reason, it is natural that Aceh has interests that are certainly different from other regions.

Considering the proposal submitted by PUSA and considering Aceh's struggle to the Republic of Indonesia, Syafrudin Prawiranegara enacted a regulation on December 17, 1949 which stated that North Sumatra was divided into two provinces, namely Aceh Province, with Tengku Muhammad Daud Beureuh as Governor and East Sumatra Province led by Governor Ferdinand Lumba Tobing, to complete the newly formed province as an autonomous region, it is necessary to form a Regional Representative Council.

Thus, the criteria for Aceh as a province have been completed, but the granting of the status of Aceh Province will later be the cause of the rift in relations between PUSA and the Republican Government which will result in the birth of DI/TII rebels in Aceh. This unpleasant incident began after the unpleasant news came from the Republican Government which apparently did not approve of the establishment of the Aceh Province which was considered a unilateral decision made by the Prime Minister which was considered too soon without constitutional negotiations, the decision was invalid. Beureuh who sought the formation of Aceh Province to implement Islamic law in line with the agreement that had been approved by President Soekarno. The government's unilateral decision forced the DPRD to hold a session on August 12, 1950 by drawing up three motions.

The results of the trial proved that the people of Aceh did not agree with the decision of the Government of the Republic, but the decision did not dampen the spirit of fighting for a review of the decision to join Aceh in North Sumatra Province considering that Aceh's lagging

position at the beginning of independence put Aceh in a difficult position because of development that did not occur after the struggle. *jihad fisabillah* carried out by the Acehnese against the Dutch, PUSA continued to make diplomatic efforts to discuss the demands that had been promised by the Government of the Republic.

The next problem is that it will be very difficult for Aceh to integrate into the province of North Sumatra because of the differences in culture, religion and customs that apply in the area. It is very difficult when combined with conditions which are not yet stable, this raises the question in the minds of the PUSA leaders, can Aceh change fate? their regions, when they had to be forced to join under the provinces, which at that time were also experiencing economic difficulties. Knowing that there is a rejection, it is important for the Government of the Republic to try to re-negotiate the matter of the Province of Aceh, to avoid a bad situation that will arise in the future.

Finally, negotiations took place through the Minister of Finance Syarifuddin Prawiranegara and his entourage with the intention of discussing the issue of Aceh, not as expected this negotiation could not be achieved properly. Stigma of good and bad can happen if in the course of government can not be established properly then security will be disturbed. It is not easy to overcome it, for that it is important to have considerations regarding the status of the Aceh Province and handling it as carefully and wisely as possible by the Government.

In the end, the Government of the Republic remained steadfast in its stance to take a unanimous decision to dissolve the Aceh Province, the decision that was finally chosen was considered good, therefore it was immediately realized by sending a letter regarding the dissolution of the former Aceh Province DPRD and its equipment which had been approved by the Governor of North Sumatra. Attached to the letter was, "Our decision dated 5

February 3, 1951 No. 2/I/PSU regarding the inauguration and dissolution of the DPRD of the former Aceh Province and its accessories, I request that you carry out this decision to those who are interested (ANRI Archives, nd) .

news of the disappointment felt by the people of Aceh reached the ears of Imam NII Kartosuwiryo. Hearing this, he immediately sent an envoy, namely Abdul Fatah Wiran Responsati, whose name was Mustafa, to approach Tengku Daud Beureuh in 1952. Through this envoy, Kartosuwiryo sent a copy of the *da'wah* about the Darul Islam movement and invited Acehnese leaders to join it. A good response was obtained from Tengku Daud Beureuh in response to sending Jahja Sulaiman a young man from Aceh to discuss the NII government and military structure (Sjamsuddin, 1990) .

Tengku Daud Beureuh pledged allegiance to *jihad* to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia in Aceh in early 1953. Darul Islam propaganda has successfully spread to all regions in Indonesia, this certainly makes it easier for Tengku Daud Beureuh to find support to support Darul Islam. After agreeing to become part of the NII, Teungku Daud Beureuh began to spread Darul Islam to the community and ended with many supporters joining, this much support was due to the failure of the Republican Government to fulfill the interests of each newly independent region as a country that still cannot understand one thing. each other.

The rebellion continues to be pursued with various strategies according to the agreed portion. Tengku Daud Beureuh with the task of consolidating the ideology of Darul Islam managed to attract a lot of sympathy from the Acehnese people because of the position held by the gang forces that had gathered around 10,000. Support and readiness which were considered mature enough to immediately launch a rebellion, the rebellion was finally launched on September 21, 1953. This coincided with the inauguration of the 3rd PON in Medan by President Soekarno.

Thus, September 21, 1953 was deemed appropriate to proclaim the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic state in Aceh.

### **Military Strategy Used in Resolving the DI/TII Rebellion in Aceh**

In general, the rebellion broke out according to the scenario of 21 September 1953. However, the militias in Idi and Peureulak had preceded their movement the day before. Convinced that the Acehese military contingent in East Sumatra and Tapanuli under Major Hasballah Haji and Captain Hasan Saleh would enter East Aceh, AR Hanafi, Gazali Idris, and Tengku Amir Husin Al Mujahid on the night of Sunday 19 September 1953 mobilized their followers. them to seize the police and civil service stations in the Idi and Peureulak areas. The power struggle went smoothly because they managed to influence the police and civil service in that place. (Umar & Chaidar, nd) .

Efforts to disband DI/TII in Aceh by calling for it did not interfere with the support of the people, finally by gathering information from the provinces and political parties, the Republican Government immediately responded to the rebellion by holding a plenary meeting on October 28, 1953. The government gave official information about the Darul Islam rebellion in plenary session of the DPR. The response is organized into 4 chapters, preceded by the following philosophical sentences: The government gave responses including the capture and victory battle experienced by the Commander of the Territorial Army Colonel Simbolon, the second discussed the existence of two groups fighting for influence, namely the uleebalang and ulama groups, the third was the efforts taken by the government to crush the rebellion.

The first step in localizing the rebellion, then ensuring inter security, strengthening army posts, and securing transport lines between posts, as well as bringing in new troops to increase the strength of the army already in Aceh. joined DI/TII in Aceh, converted to join 6

DI/TII in Aceh, and promised to carry out development in all fields needed by Aceh (Ismail, 1994) .

between the two parties, while waiting for the rebels to run out of ammunition to survive, Colonel Simbolon's troops continued maintain the siege of the Garot mosque. The defense, led by Major Ibrahim Saleh, who was an Official Command 1 White Elephant Division, Tengku Cik Ditiro, was finally repulsed from the Garot area and the TNI managed to control the area (Dewanto, 2011) . The fall of the Garot area did not dampen the fighting spirit of the DI/TII group which was part of the Indonesian Islamic Army to continue the struggle, by launching a different strategy as directed by Hasan Saleh, namely trying to maintain the safety of members of the Indonesian Islamic Army who were the capital of the DI rebellion. /TII in Aceh, because there is no meaning in rebelling without the support of the army to fight.

Therefore, to avoid casualties, Hasan Saleh formed small troops led by a commander to return to their respective areas of origin and fight in guerrilla missions, then asked the followers consisting of mukim priests to return to the village and work as usual. In the daily communique on the situation in Aceh on October 22, 1953, seeing groups of Mujahideen fighters that had spread to East Aceh, there was a two-hour shootout with security guards in Aceh. It was reported that the 4 km long railway between Sigli and Bireuen had been damaged to prevent the entry of outside transport. The daily communique on 23 October 1953 organized a clean-up movement along the Sigli road and jointly sought to repair the railway and telephone lines between Sigli and Bireuen. The Tjotbada area occurred in a fight and between the gang and the Battalion B Company troops the resistance carried out from the house resulted in the house which was a hiding place being burned down, causing casualties. (ANRI Archives, nd) .

On October 26, troops from Battalion B had laid siege to the gang in the village of Aloe ulu around Bireuen until it was said in the daily communique at 19.30 that the gang, namely members of DI/TII, ran wildly and the troops managed to seize weapons from them without any casualties. In Central Aceh, Darul Islam troops occupied Takengon, as in Meureudu, they were only able to enter the city after the Republican troops ran out of ammunition. Another city that fell was Tapaktuan in South Aceh.

On the morning of October 27, 1953, the delegation of the Governor of North Sumatra SM Amin visited Kroeng Raya, participating in the delegation, among them were Regent A. Wahab, Overste Tituler Sutikno, Keerd. Nyak Umar Police, Information Coordinator Achmid Abdullah, and several others, after witnessing the situation in the area around Kroeng Raya meeting attended by about 200 residents around the market. In his speech, the Regent hoped that the people of Kroeng Raya would remain faithful and loyal to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia so that the restoration of security could be implemented soon, now it is constantly hitting the wheel of government that has stopped since the Daud Beureueh incident.

The Governor of North Sumatra SM Amin thought of the best solution for solving this never-ending problem, finally an approach was taken by trying to send a letter to Tengku Daud Beureueh, Hasan Ali, Husen Al-Mujahid, and other Darul Islam leaders on December 5, 1953. In a letter the Governor asked for their opinion on the possibility of an amicable settlement. Responding to the governor's letter, Husen Al-Mujahid responded that ending the dispute between the Indonesian government and the people of Aceh was still possible as long as both parties really wanted to show good faith.

The approach taken by the Governor of North Sumatra Amin was not approved by the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, according to him, military

operations were the right choice to break the ongoing rebellion in Aceh. However, the conditions that occur are not in accordance with the reality that occurred in Aceh because the call made by Tengku Daud Beureueh in fact managed to attract a lot of public sympathy. The implementation of Islamic law in Aceh became the main capital in the goal of this rebellion. Mujahideen fighters collect the type of war income collected from community subsidies which are delivered to those who fight guerrillas in the mountains, from the interview results, interviewees said that many people joined the DI/TII movement based on personal desires (Saleh Interview, 14 December 2020).

A trading network was formed between the East Coast of Aceh and the Malay Peninsula, especially Penang to facilitate commercial transactions as well as logistics supply lines. With this success, it succeeded in producing tangible results because throughout 1954 there had been attacks or encounters carried out by gangs, both on military companies and *mabrighs* as well as against cities that had been controlled by the Government of the Republic, Garot and Peukan Pidie in August 1954, Sare, Peukan Biluy Aceh Besar, in May and October 1954. This operation was really tiring and troublesome for the state security apparatus in dealing with this rebellion which greatly benefited from the geographical conditions of Aceh which had obstacles in the form of steep valleys, high hills, groves, and swamps (Sulaiman, 1997).

Efforts to stop the rebellion continue to be carried out by carrying out mass arrests of Acehnese residents, both on the land of Aceh itself and outside Aceh without a clear examination of those who are related or suspected of being part of DI/TII, however, these mass arrests only used alleged targets. Therefore, after September 1953 prisons and school rooms in Aceh and East Sumatra were full of innocent people. However, he had to be caught and held captive and transported to



East Sumatra by sea and thrown into the police custody prison in Medan. Outside Aceh, several people suspected of being involved in the Daud Beureueh rebellion were arrested, including the arrests of Ali Hasjmy, Syeh Marhaban, and Nyak Neh Rica (Hasjmy, 1985) .

The damage in the area which is the basis of DI/TII as well as the victims are increasingly cornering the Government of the Republic , criticism also continues to come because the strategy has not been successful to reconcile the conditions of the two parties, the decisions made by the cabinet are also considered wrong because it causes the division of society in Aceh into two camps that are pro and contra against DI/TII. This affects the atmosphere that should be able to calm down, but becomes heated because the policies implemented are not focused on solving problems .

Until the peak of the problem arose when the platoon arrived which disturbed the security of the people in the Leupung area. This was considered dangerous, so the DI/TII group from the VII Kuta Karang Regiment intercepted a motorcycle truck carrying 15 soldiers, 1 civilian, and 142 battalions based in Lhoknga.

platoon who was stationed in Lhong Aceh Besar that morning wanted to take supplies in Kutaraja, Pawang Leman as the leader of the gang took the opportunity to bring troops to the Mount Paroe area to hide among the narrow bends of the mountain climb . As soon as the truck carrying this military unit passed, they fired simultaneously at the truck and caused the truck to catch fire because it was loaded with fuel and fifteen troops were killed, the only one remaining who managed to escape and reported the incident to a source who was Tengku Saleh ( *Cot Jeumpa Archives.Pdf*, nd) .

This incident finally reached the fellow soldiers in the battalion sparking anger and anger at the same time seeing the fate of their comrades, this unit immediately headed to the location after hearing the news, but none of the DI/TII 8

groups seemed to have left place of occurrence by returning to guerrilla into the mountain. Finally, to avenge them, it didn't take long according to the daily incident of an eye witness on February 26, 1955 at around 12 noon, the security forces came to people's homes in Cot Jeumpa and took all the men who were on the scene from every house, then taken to the beach and executed without checking whether they were part of the DI/TII group. This incident killed 26 people.

Seeing the situation in Aceh, in December 1955 the Central Government stopped military assistance ( *Militaire Bijstand* ) and imposed a state of martial law. with the formation of a congress named the Student/Youth/Student/Aceh Indonesian Congress in Medan. The congress was chaired by a presidium consisting of Chairman Tengku Abdul Syam and Secretary Anis Idham. The result of this congress was to urge the government to immediately stop the fighting and settle the bloody way in Aceh by deliberation, in accordance with the wishes of the Acehnese people (Hasjmy, 1985) .

Not only attracting the attention of youths, students and communities outside Aceh, the Darul Islam issue was also the goal of the Ex-Elephant Division Officers, who at that time were scattered outside Aceh, felt called upon to discuss the settlement of security in Aceh at the reunion . Several attachments were produced, stating that it is very important to study the character of the Acehnese people , and suggesting that the government should follow the recommendations of the student congress, re-assign the responsibility for security to the sons of Aceh, by establishing an Aceh security settlement command that is directly under the Army Chief of Staff .

Considering the proposals and conditions in Aceh where there have been many victims, both from DI/TII and from the state security apparatus or the TNI. The economy is also chaotic and people feel fear and anxiety. Finally Hatta asked

Syamaun Gaharu to compile a written view on Aceh's security, after sending his views to Bung Hatta and the Army Generals.

Finally, General AH Nasution summoned Major Syamaun Gaharu at that time while on duty in Banjarmasin to hear his views on security in Aceh, on the same occasion Syamaun Gaharu conveyed about the settlement of security in Aceh it would be better if the task of resolving it was handed over to the sons of Aceh. During this meeting, Samaun Gaharu also said that it was very difficult to carry out a security mission if Aceh was still under the TT-I/Bukit Barisan Command (Djarahdam, 1971).

Realizing this desire, Syamaun Gaharu asked for time to discuss with Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, the two-hour discussion agreed to settle security in Aceh with the strategy offered by Syamaun Gaharu. However, with an important condition, namely the authority of the Republican Government must be upheld. Finally, the Prime Minister gave instructions on the government's attitude which would serve as guidelines for action, namely that the government would not carry out a self-defeating policy, but the government would not close the preventive efforts undertaken to restore security in Aceh (Ramdhan & Jabbar, 1995).

The return of Syamaun Gaharu and the appointment of Governor Ali Hasjmy are a very good duo to resolve the issue of the rebellion in Aceh, the implementation of the Wise Principles Conception strategy has been implemented as for the purpose of not abandoning military operations, but seeking a political solution. The trick is to make contact with the movement to find the best way out in resolving the Aceh Darul Islam movement. This is intended to avoid prolonged bloodshed.

Efforts to communicate through colleagues continued to be carried out by Syamaun Gaharu who was also accompanied by his staff, Lieutenant Usman Nyak Gade. The informant 9

approach continues to use one of the couriers who will meet Leman's father to suggest communication. Stopping shooting in Aceh requires an approach to Darul Islam figures, so based on the agreement of the two parties, it was finally agreed to hold negotiations which were chosen to be held at the house of Pawang Leman's father, in Lamteh Village on April 8, 1957 (Saleh interview, December 14 2020).

To socialize the Lamteh Pledge, Syamaun Gaharu and Ali Hasjmy, two confidants of the Republican Government in the recovery effort of the Aceh region, met with Tengku Daud Beureueh in a friendly meeting. However, it turns out that the Lamteh Pledge agreement has indeed not restored the situation to a peaceful region because many areas, especially the location of the Darul Islam fortifications, are still ready to defend the Darul Islam rebellion and fight for the State of Aceh (NBA).

Until the peak of the emergence of an atmosphere of division within the body of Darul Islam itself. This led to the emergence of two different camps within Darul Islam, the revolutionary council who became supporters of stopping the rebellion and Tengku Daud Beureueh who was still loyal before an agreement could be agreed. Unaware of the unresolved Aceh political stage, again Syamaun Gaharu and Ali Hasjmy they reported on the conditions and problems they were facing in May 1959.

Finally, AH Nasution invited them to present directly in the cabinet meeting. In the cabinet meeting, Syamaun Gaharu finally explained the meaning of the Wise Principle Concept that had been applied in Aceh. While trying to ensure a non-violent solution to the cabinet, the cabinet finally agreed to this on the condition that Prime Minister Juanda had to send a delegation to Aceh to resolve the issue peacefully by negotiating with President Soekarno's permission.

Finally in May 1959, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Hardi, led the government's

mission to Aceh to inaugurate the restoration of security and welcome the return of republicans who had been rebellious to Indonesia for 6 years. With the negotiations at an impasse, this is where local leaders took part. Mission Hardi conveyed his stance by providing the first alternative whether the Revolutionary Council is determined to continue the armed rebellion with the consequence that the people of Aceh will be left in a state of suffering and misery. Second, whether the Revolutionary Council is willing to resolve the upheaval peacefully, it can accept the proposal in the Decree of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia no. 1/Missi/1959, dated 26 May 1959.<sup>22</sup> This decree gave special status to Aceh in the sense that it was able to carry out the widest possible regional autonomy, especially in the fields of religion, education and so that the bloody upheaval could be stopped in order to restore peace and tranquility among the Acehnese people. (Muhajir, 2016).

Tengku Daud Beureuh's unwillingness to return to Mother Earth's lap is proof of the unfinished business of restoring security in Aceh. Until the end of the Wisdom Principle Concept and also the end of Syamaun Gaharu's position as KDMA commander in Aceh. Replaced by Colonel Muhammad Jasin on November 10, 1960. M. Yasin tried to discuss with his fellow ABRI members to discuss a non-violent solution for the return of Tengku Daud Beureuh to the Acehnese people and the Republican Government.

The solution was finally trying to isolate Tengku Daud Beureuh and his troops to the mountain area and waiting for him to come back down to the Acehnese people due to the depletion of supplies owned by Panglima M. Yasin also stated that Islamic law was applied in Aceh which eventually became one of the things that moved Tengku Daud's intentions Beureuh to return to the lap of the people of Aceh. To welcome this return, a car and bus convoy of community and government leaders was sent to meet

Daud Beureuh in East Aceh and bring him back to Kutaraja. On May 8, after praying at the Kutaraja Mosque, for the first time since leaving Kutaraja in early 1952, Daud Beureuh briefly said that, by order of the people, he had returned to the people. This also means that there are no longer among them, fellow nations who are hostile to each other. He stated that the enmity between them for eight years, ten months and twenty-seven days had been resolved and Aceh had returned to the Republican Government (Disjarah-I, 1972).

### **The Impact of the Enforcement of Military Assisted Regions ( *Militaire Bijstand* ) in Aceh**

In the economic field when Syafruddin Prawiranegara served as Minister of Finance through his decision in regulation No. 538/10 regarding the regulation of the exchange rate of RIS money with local currencies circulating in Java and Sumatra, effective from March 30, 1950, the application of this rule was detrimental to Aceh which was currently it already uses local currency, namely Urips, Uripsu, and uriba. Not only that, it turns out that the regulation regulates the issue of plantations and mining which are the main sources of regional income for Aceh, the responsibility for which must be transferred to the Republican Government (Sulaiman, 1997).

The DI/TII movement also affects the economy of the people who work for Dutch-owned companies where mining companies are trying to rise from the downturn due to the scorched earth that continues to occur in Pangkalan Brandan. Such as Husin Almudjahid as the leader of Aceh's oil mines who left his duties for the sake of join the DI/TII movement (Simangunsong & Suprayitno, 2019). The government's failure to provide an adequate irrigation system has greatly harmed farmers in Aceh's districts, such as Aceh Besar, Pidie, Aceh Utara, and Aceh Timur (northeast part) because these farmers rely heavily on rice cultivation.

However, hampered irrigation development made many farmers abandon their fields . critical.

In the field of education, the government seems to have decided to make SMP the highest level of secular education in Aceh. In mid-1951, the government closed the only SMA in Kutaraja and subsidized twenty-six of its students to study in Medan (Sjamsuddin, 1990). . In the midst of the uprising, many schools had to close temporarily to avoid innocent victims and the lack of teachers as educators in the areas where DI/TII was based in Aceh. This became very unfortunate for the Aceh region which was left behind after the issuance of an adverse policy, namely the government made SMP the highest level of secular education in Aceh. In mid-1951 the government closed the only SMA (High School) in Kutaraja.

### **The Impact of the Application of the Concept of Wise Principles in Aceh**

Rehabilitating the province was a draft program. Immediately after KDMA was formed, Syamaun Gaharun continued to intensify barter trade in Aceh, despite efforts by the Central Government to stop it. He was dissatisfied with the barter trade that prevailed on a 30-70 percent basis, so in mid-1957, with the support of the Aceh Regional Indonesian Merchant Association (GASIDA) demanded a one hundred percent barter system for Aceh (Sjamsuddin, 1990) .

To advance the prosperity of the people of Aceh by opening up new job opportunities in accordance with the efforts and aspirations of the government in fostering the revival of the Indonesian people in the arena of political, social, political and economic growth, the government implements a barter system. Not forgetting the infrastructure to support the speed of the economy, such as road repairs, connecting bridges between regions which initially had to be traversed by rafts, and the construction of irrigation systems succeeded in helping the people in the Sigli area. This is all contained in the

realization plan in the letter from MKN/KASAD General Nasution.

The last five years of the 1950s. In this regard, the number of public elementary schools increased sharply from 423 schools with 79,863 students in 1953 to 607 schools with 111,536 students in 1960. The growth rate of government schools increased even more at the secondary level. Until the time of the rebellion there were only seven SMP (one in the district) and one SMA in the entire area, but seven years later there were 28 SMP (one in each kewedanaan) and eight SMA. There was also a marked increase in the number of government-owned vocational schools, from 22 in 1953 to 33 in 1960 (Sjamsuddin, 1990) .

For the hard work of YDKA and the planning commission, they succeeded in planning the laying of the first stone for the construction of the Darussalam Student City (KOPELMA) on August 17, 1958, on behalf of the Central Government. Minister of Religion KH Mohd. Ilyas came to Banda Aceh and his aspiration to build education was proven by the issuance of a permit signed by President Soekarno to build the first university in Aceh, namely Syiah Kuala University which is known as the *Jantong Hate icon* of the Acehnese people. The existence of this educational institution as a silent witness to the reconciliation of a struggle and became a turning point towards the nation's long-dated dream was finally realized with the opening of the Faculty of Economics which was inaugurated directly attended by President Soekarno on September 2, 1959 (Disjarah-I, 1972) .

Development in the government sector is one of the prioritized aspects in post-DI/TII Aceh. Development in this field can be seen, among other things , from the government's efforts to improve the implementation of certain affairs which have been clearly delegated by the central government to the government of the Special Region of Aceh.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the results of research that has been carried out in accordance with the stages with the help of historical methods, it can be concluded as follows:

Facing the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh, demanding the government to immediately extinguish the fire of the rebellion that had spread, efforts were immediately made to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. The implementation of the Military Assisted Region (*Militaire Bijstand*) became the first strategy implemented to send new troops to secure conditions in Aceh while maintaining ongoing military operations. *Militaire Bijstand* in fact did not run smoothly. The emergence of the next military strategy called the Wise Principle Concept became a new beginning for the settlement of the rebellion in Aceh. The success of this conception was finally proven by the signing of the Lamteh Pledge agreement which was approved as a sign of ending the long-standing shooting.

The return of Aceh to be part of the Republic of Indonesia is a new beginning for Aceh to bounce back to catch up with the impact of the very sad uprising. After the Lamteh Pledge, the KDMA Command Lieutenant Colonel Syamaun Gaharu went to the regions to carry out the Regional Tri Karya program. This program includes restoration of security, filling in broad autonomy, and regional development from all fields. As the Aceh regional warlord for the Aceh region,

The builders came from various sectors, namely education which was the aspiration of all Acehnese people. Finally, it was realized with the presence of Kopelma and the inauguration of the Faculty of Economics institution which is now part of Unsyiah which is growing very rapidly to educate the next generation of Aceh in the future. The economic sector opened new jobs, the construction of roads, irrigation and bridges, the establishment of KDMA which eventually became the Kodam in Aceh. The

government's efforts to improve the implementation of certain affairs have clearly been delegated by the central government to the government of the Special Region of Aceh. Affairs by the Level I Regional Government are also handed over to the Level II Regional Government in addition to the right to own household.

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