



Original Article

Military Reform: Informal Military Power in Indonesian Politics After 1998

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Abstract:

Indonesia entered the era of political reform after the collapse of the Soeharto in 1998, which was marked by an agenda of government reform, including reform within the military. Reforms and dismantling of the dual-single doctrine (Dwifungsi) brought the army back to the barracks, and regulations ensured the army focused on its duties as guardians of national defense. Later in Indonesia's political process, informal military groups played a role behind the scenes as part of the team that formulated strategic policies. This research analyzes the development of military reform and influence in Indonesia from the reign of BJ Habibie to Joko Widodo and the factors that influenced the development of military reform. This paper uses a qualitative approach to describe the informal power of military groups in the political turmoil in Indonesia. This article uses data collection techniques in the form of documentation studies with a content analysis approach from various studies and news. The informal political power of the military group had a different impact on numerous policies of the President of Indonesia after the reformation. In the era of President BJ Habibie, the military still dominated, although the president later gave limits, especially to stop the Dwifungsi ABRI principle. In the Abdurrahman Wahid era, the influence of informal groups declined relatively due to Gus Dur's frontal policies to enforcing human rights. During the Megawati era, retired military officers strengthened the military's influence in Benny Moerdani's circle of influence. Under SBY, the influence of informal groups can be seen in his efforts to revoke TNI's business units entirely in various fields. The influence of informal groups returned in President Jokowi's era with his policy of recruiting retired military generals in various strategic posts in civilian ministries.

Keywords: Military Reform, President, Indonesia, TNI, Public Policy.

Introduction

Indonesia entered the era of political reform after the collapse of the Soeharto in 1998, which was marked by an agenda of government reform, including reform within the military. This is because one of the demands of reform is to make the Indonesian military more professional rather than political, as happened during the New Order era. Based on these reform demands, the military carried out various kinds of reform agendas, such as reviving the idea of the military's "New Paradigm," detaching itself institutionally from the legislature, separating the TNI (Indonesian National Army) from the Polri (Indonesian National Police),



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and handing over the businesses of military institutions as stipulated in Law Number 34 of 2004 ([Kosandi & Wahono, 2020](#)). Military reform is part of an initiative to democratize civil-military relations through institutional arrangements that place civilian authority above the military by referring to four essential principles. The first principle is to strengthen the civilian presence to be the policy maker of the state defense. The second is strengthening the Ministry of Defense as an institution representing civilians in managing national defense and security. Third, the civilian-led defense authority should be subordinated directly to the president. Fourth, measures must be taken to ensure that the military forces remain separate and that no unification process is carried out ([Kardi, 2015](#)).

Just as bureaucratic reform has been closely aligned with politics ([Khairurrizqo, 2023](#)), military reform cannot be wholly separated from the military's influence. Reform and eliminating the Dwifungsi doctrine brought the army back to the barracks, and regulations ensured that it focused on its duties as guardians of defense ([Sebastian & Isgindarsah, 2012](#)). Later in Indonesia's political landscape, informal military groups played a role behind the scenes as part of the team that formulated strategic policies (Sebastian, 2007). This fact can be seen from the involvement of various military groups and their networks in political parties and directly being assigned to a strategic position ([Kosandi & Wahono, 2020](#)). The number of military retirees who get strategic positions in political parties represents at least two critical things. First, political parties need the military's involvement to strengthen their influence in society with their various experiences and abilities while serving in the military. Second, political parties need the networks and expertise of military groups regarding networks of policymakers, business influence, and community networks in cities and or villages ([Soesilo, 2015](#)). These two factors cannot be detached from the fact that the military's power was so significant and influential at all levels of government during the New Order era ([Leni, 2017](#)). The study of the complicated relationship between the military and politics was written in the book *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance*. The book by Marcus Mietzner aims to evaluate the military reform program and its relationship with Indonesian politics. The book has four main arguments that explain why civilian power in Indonesia has not been able to subordinate military power after Reformasi, which are: First, civilian officers in Indonesia have not been able to subordinate military power: First, leading military officers (especially those around General Wiranto) have played a key role in organizing power in the transition from Soeharto to Habibie. Second, fragmentation among Indonesia's civilian elite has forced the military to play politics alongside the civilian elite in the struggle for power in Indonesia. Third, sectarian clashes in Maluku, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, as well as separatism movements in Aceh and Papua, led to the perception that military reforms weakened the ability to deal with sectarian clashes and separatism. Fourth, there was institutional solid resistance within the military to reform as it could threaten political and economic interests ([Mietzner, 2006](#)). One of the primary references in the study of military and political interactivity is research from Harold Crouch entitled *Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto*. This book, written by Harold Crouch, discusses political reform in Indonesia from 1998-2008. In Chapter V of this book, Crouch chronologically explains the military reform from the Habibie

administration to the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration. According to Crouch, three main problems remain unsolved regarding military reform: territorial command, military finance (military businesses), and the problem of impunity of TNI officials who are considered to have committed human rights violations ([Crouch, 2010](#)).

The most recent research on the interaction of the military and politics is an article entitled *Military Reform in the Post-New Order Indonesia: A Transitional or a New Subtle Role in Indonesian Democracy?* This article by Meidi Kosandi and Subur Wahono discusses military reform in Indonesia since 1998. They argue that the military has not fully implemented military reform and instead has become a group influencing political and democratic conditions in Indonesia. They explained that the army group managed to regain political influence by cooperating with civilian elite groups informally to participate in the political scene ([Kosandi & Wahono, 2020](#)). This article also provides a theoretical study of civil-military relations in Indonesia through three main models: political liberalism/military professionalism. This model explains that the military only acts as a professional state defense group, so it may not engage in politics. That way, civilian groups are in charge (civil supremacy). Second, political realism/military interventionism. This model explains that the military intervenes in local politics when the following factors are present: weak civilian leadership, solid military institutional resistance to civilian rule, civil-military conflict, incomplete professionalization of the military, and the influence of conservative politicians. Thus, this model sees military groups as political actors who have their interests ([Kosandi & Wahono, 2020](#)).

Third, political culture/military historicalism. This model explains that historical developments will determine the role of military groups. Thus, each historical chapter of a country will determine the military's role. For example, military groups had a significant role as maintainers of the unity of the Indonesian nation during colonialism and independence. Still, during the Reformasi period, the military's role changed to become professionals. However, because the military still believes in its role as the guardian of Indonesia's national unity, it tries to stay involved in politics, even in an informal way. This article explains that the liberalism and realism models cannot fully explain the military's role in Indonesia. Therefore, a cultural model is needed to describe today's military's role in Indonesia. Based on these problems and previous studies, this paper tries to analyze the development of military reform and its influence from the reign of BJ Habibie to Joko Widodo, as well as the factors that influenced the development of military reform. To answer these questions, this paper is directed towards a descriptive analysis of the development of military reform and politics based on the theoretical framework developed by previous researchers.

Methods

This study will use a qualitative approach to describe the informal power of military groups in Indonesia. Through a qualitative approach, this article will also explain how the interaction between Indonesia's military and political forces, especially political parties, impacts each party's political interaction to win elections and political contestation. Furthermore, this paper will also explain how the influence of informal groups in the military occurs in the process of political

competition both at the local and national levels.

This research also uses data collection techniques in documentary studies with a content analysis approach from various studies and news related to the influence of informal groups in political dynamics in Indonesia. Data analysis is carried out simultaneously, including data collection, reduction, presentation, and verification ([Hamzah, 2021](#)).

Results and Discussion

According to Huntington's typology, the Indonesian military can be conceptualized as a revolutionary Pretorian army with a strong tendency to enter politics and gain power (Said, 2001). This is closely related to the history of the Indonesian army, which was neither created by the government nor specifically by political parties, as in some examples in other countries ([Firdaus, 2016](#)). Crouch explained that the military was tasked with self-reform during the Habibie administration. This task was given to high-ranking reformist officers within the military to convince other generals to drop the doctrine of Dwifungsi ([Crouch, 2010](#)). However, the generals within the military split into two groups after facing democratization pressure from the media and the public: First, the reformist group represented by Prabowo Subianto, a green/Islamist military group dominated by officers outside Java and close to Habibie. This group believed it would be further alienated if the military did not adapt to democratization pressures ([Tan, 2006](#)). Second, the nationalist group represented by Wiranto (commonly referred to as the red-white/nationalist military group) was not particularly close to Habibie. This group continued to support ABRI's Dwifungsi and rejected changes in the military's role ([Crouch, 2010](#)). As time went on, Habibie, who was initially close to Prabowo, saw the potential for Prabowo's defiance after Soeharto fell. Therefore, Habibie turned to Wiranto, who immediately dismissed Prabowo ([He, 2008](#)).

Later, General Wiranto finally accepted TNI's demand not to return to the Dwifungsi doctrine, so he entrusted a group of reformist "intellectual" staff officers to conceptualize the role of military reform. This concept of change is known as the 'New Paradigm' which positions the military not in a government position but the military needs to influence government policy indirectly ([Wirman et al., 2022](#)). With this new paradigm, the military decreased its participation in day-to-day politics. For example, the Social and Political Chief of Staff dissolved, the withdrawal of military officers in the bureaucratic administration, Parliament, and the Golkar Party, and the separation of the TNI and the Police. Despite these changes within the military, Mietzner explains that there is still a strong institutional resistance within the military to civilian authority. This can be seen from the TNI's actions that took a different path to President Habibie's policy in the East Timor case ([Mietzner, 2006](#)).

During the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid/Gus Dur (1999-2001), he had ambitions to create civilian supremacy in his government ([Mietzner, 2006](#)). However, three main things constrained Gus Dur's ambitions: First, despite receiving support from the MPR, Gus Dur's party only received 8% of the vote, making his political position very vulnerable. Second, his experience and background as a religious leader and democracy activist meant he had no experience of military reform. Third, most of his military reformist decisions were based on immediate intuition rather than long-term planning ([Anwar, 2002](#)). In the early period of Gus Dur's reign, civilian control

over the military was still strong due to the spirit of reform that called for civilian supremacy over the military and the ability of civil society to dominate government. Support for Gus Dur as the reformed president was also still strong. It encouraged Gus Dur to make significant changes in the military with various strategic policies, as well as starting to reposition the power camps or factions within the military ([Desch & Jenderal, 2002](#)). At first, Gus Dur appointed six military officers in his cabinet, one of whom was General Wiranto who got the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security to fulfill the interests of military groups. Furthermore, Gus Dur handed over the leadership of the TNI to Admiral Widodo Adi Sucipto to have control over the TNI and weaken Wiranto ([Firdaus, 2016](#)).

Gus Dur indicated strong civilian control by appointing Prof. Juwono Sudarsono, a professor at the University of Indonesia, as Minister of Defense and Security. This appointment was Gus Dur's affirmation of his vision of civilian supremacy over the military. In terms of power politics, Gus Dur wanted to emphasize that he had full power to control the military and tried to close off all political maneuvering space from factions within the military ([Yulianto, 2002](#)). Furthermore, Gus Dur appointed General Tyasno Sudarto as Chief of Army Staff (KSAD), who did not have a reformist background but opposed Wiranto when he was nominated as vice president. Gus Dur misperceived SBY as being too close to Wiranto, so he appointed SBY Minister of Mining and Energy. SBY's appointment as minister prevented him from reforming the military because he was forced to retire early to serve as a minister ([Hidayat, 2007](#)). In the meantime, Wiranto was labeled a severe human rights violator, and Gus Dur sacked him from his ministerial position. Following Wiranto's dismissal, the demilitarization movement continued through Admiral Widodo. In February 2000, Widodo introduced the term "civilian supremacy" and released the doctrine of Dwifungsi in a TNI leadership meeting. Furthermore, the Coordinating Agency for Assistance in Strengthening National Stability (Bakorstanas) and the Directorate of Social Politics in the Ministry of Home Affairs were dismissed ([Crouch, 2010](#)).

It is worth noting that during Gus Dur's era as president, domestic political, social, and economic conditions have yet to recover fully and tend to be in a non-conducive situation. This situation was an accumulation of the military's lack of solidity due to Gus Dur's intervention, which was considered too far, Gus Dur's hostility to the political elite in the DPR RI and other stakeholders or policymakers from various sectors as well as economic conditions that were still not fully recovered as a long-term effect of the 1998 economic crisis ([Sukri, 2020](#)). Two ministers from PDI-P (Laksamana Sukardi) and Golkar (Jusuf Kalla) were sacked by Gus Dur in 2000. This led to the impeachment of President Gus Dur the following year. In 2001, Gus Dur proposed to military leaders to declare a state of emergency to dissolve the DPR, which was rejected by then Army Chief of Staff General Endriartono Sutarto. Following this rejection, Gus Dur dismissed SBY from his cabinet the MPR began a session to consider his impeachment, Gus Dur again fought back by issuing a Decree declaring a state of emergency. However, this was ignored by the MPR, which continued the impeachment process and swore in Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri as President on July 23, 2001 ([Siddiq, 2019](#)).

In contrast to Gus Dur, President Megawati (2001-2005) had little interest in reforming Indonesia's military establishment. This was evidenced by the appointment of General Endriartono Sutarto as Commander in Chief in 2002, as well as General

Ryamizard Ryacudu and Lieutenant General Bibit Waluyo as Army Chief of Staff and Kostrad Commander, respectively. The latter two were considered conservative in the military and openly rejected the idea of reform within the military (Yulianto, 2002). In addition, Megawati chose the Minister of Defense, Matori Abdul Djalil, who did not have a military background. Even when Matori suffered a stroke in August 2003, his position was not replaced, and he was only given the status of inactive minister throughout the Megawati administration (Wirman et al., 2022).

One of the important military findings in the Megawati era is that Megawati's circle of power was mostly believed to be filled by informal groups under Benny Moerdani's network of power. Based on some previous research, the main purpose of Benny Moerdani placing his people in military circles and other influential groups is to, among others First, collect logistics for political operations aimed at maintaining power either through government agency units or through BUMN and other government institutions. Second, to significantly weaken civilian power by infiltrating political parties such as PPP, Golkar, PKB, and other medium-grade parties. Third, political divisions were conducted to strengthen Megawati's power, especially with the split of Nationalist and Religious groups (Sujito, 2002).

Another important mark during the Megawati administration was the decision of the then TNI Commander Endriartono Sutarto to revoke the TNI faction in the MPR in 2004, which was 5 years earlier than the original plan of 2009. In 2004, the House of Representatives successfully passed Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI, which became the legal basis for the separation of the TNI from factions and national political powers (Soekarnoputri, 2021). The ratification of Law No. 34 of 2004 also revoked the Defense and Security Law No. 20 of 1982. Previously, Law No.20 of 1982 was a law that provided the legal basis for the integration of defense and security functions within ABRI while recognizing military interference in the concept of ABRI's Dwifungsi. The unification of national defense and security not only has bad implications in the form of the unification of the TNI and Polri into ABRI, but also the politicization of ABRI. Therefore, the Depoliticization policies in the Megawati era were an attempt to reaffirm the focus of the TNI and Polri on state defense and security (Azmi, 2023).

One of the political acts that involved retired military personnel in the national political arena was Megawati's decision through her party PDI-Perjuangan to support retired TNI personnel to become governors in the political process both in elections through DPRD and direct regional head elections. As in Table. 1 below

Table 1. Retired TNI and Polri Supported by Megawati to Become Governor

No.	Name	Position/Candidate	Period
1	Letnan Jenderal TNI (Purn.) Dr. (H.C.) H. Sutyoso	Gubernur DKI Jakarta ke-14	6 Oktober 1997 –7 Oktober 2007
2	Mayjen TNI (Purn.) Raden Nana Nuriana	Gubernur Jawa Barat ke-13	13 Juni 1993 –13 Juni 2003
3	Mayjen TNI (Purn.) H. Imam UtomoSoeparno	Gubernur JawaTimur ke-12	23 Agustus 1998 –26 Agustus 2008

4	Mayor Jenderal TNI (Purn.) Mardiyanto	Gubernur Jawa Tengah ke-11	1998–2008
5	Mayor Jenderal TNI (AD) H. Suwarna Abdul Fatah	Gubernur Kalimantan Timur ke-10 dan 11	2003-2006
6	Mayjen TNI (Purn.) H. Amin Syam	Gubernur Sulawesi Selatan ke-6	19 Januari 2003 –19 Januari 2008
7	Mayor Jenderal TNI (Purn) Haji Tengku Rizal Nurdin	Gubernur Sumatera Utara ke-1	15 Juni 1998 –5 September 2005
8	Letnan Jenderal TNI (Purn.) H. Bibit Waluyo	Gubernur Jawa Tengah ke-13	23 Agustus 2008 –23 Agustus 2013
9	Mayor Jenderal TNI (Purn.) Tri Tamtomo	Calon Gubernur Sumatera Utara	Pilkada Langsung dan tidak terpilih
10	Jenderal TNI (Purn) Agum Gumelar	Calon Gubernur Jawa Barat	Pilkada Langsung dan tidak terpilih
11	Brigjen TNI (Purn) Karel A. Ralahalu	Gubernur Maluku ke-13	2003 –2013
12	Mayjen TNI (Purn) Zainal Basri Palaguna	Gubernur Sulawesi Selatan ke-5	1993 –2003
13	Komjen Pol (Purn) I Made Mangku Pastika	Gubernur Bali	2008 –2013

Source ([Soekarnoputri, 2021](#))

During the transition from Megawati to SBY's administration, many regional conflicts convinced military groups of the military's special rights to safeguard the Republic of Indonesia. At that time, SBY, as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, was forced to authorize the military to overcome the rebellion in Aceh in 2003. After SBY was elected President (2005-2014), he finally authorized Vice President Jusuf Kalla to conduct negotiations with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The negotiations were considered a betrayal of the republic by PDI-P and Golkar politicians ([Bhakti et al., 2009](#)).

During his administration, SBY had to control the TNI by gaining majority support in the DPR. SBY's attempt to control the TNI encountered resistance from Megawati's group and the DPR, which led to General Ryamizard replacing General Endriartono. By MPR Decree No. VII/2000 and the National Defense Law, the President must obtain the approval of the DPR to appoint the TNI Commander. To solve the problem, SBY withdrew the nomination and postponed Ryamizard's nomination until he reached retirement age. After Ryamizard's retirement, SBY nominated the Air Force Chief of Staff, Marshal Djoko Suyanto, to replace Endriartono in January 2006. During this time, Jusuf Kalla defeated Akbar Tandjung (the incumbent Chairman) at the Golkar Party congress in December 2004. Kalla's victory

and Golkar's shift of orientation led to majority support for the government in the DPR ([Sahrasad, 2016](#)).

SBY replaced hard-line military officers with SBY's men. For example, General Djoko Susanto successfully replaced Ryamizard as Army Chief of Staff in 2005. Then, at the end of 2007, Djoko Susanto was promoted to Commander in Chief. Then, General Agustadi Sasongko Purnomo was appointed Chief of Staff. SBY's brother-in-law, Lieutenant General Erwin Sudjono, was appointed Kostrad Commander and later became TNI Chief of General Staff. While another brother-in-law, Brigadier General Pramono Edhie Wibowo, was appointed Commander General of Kopassus in 2006 ([Sebastian, 2007](#)). SBY did all of this to achieve the Aceh peace agreement and secure presidential authority over the military ([Crouch, 2010](#)).

It is one thing to take over leadership from a group that disagrees with SBY, but it is another thing to institutionalize the TNI. Political economic conditions still enable the TNI to obtain independent funding from the businesses they manage. This causes TNI to have high institutional autonomy. According to Mietzner, the Habibie and Megawati administrations largely ignored the problem of TNI's independence and structural subordination to civilian control. While Abdurrahman Wahid's administration failed to push for significant change despite trying to push for radical reform ([Mietzner, 2006](#)).

Mietzner's research states that the military has always been one of the obstacles to peace efforts in the defense policies of civilian presidents. Mietzner mentions how ABRI openly obstructed referendum efforts in East Timor at that time. This effort then made ABRI finally have to face international isolation due to various cases of human rights violations in East Timor. Likewise, during the reigns of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati, the military defied Gus Dur's orders to avoid physical action against separatist groups and prioritize a human rights approach ([Barton, 2002](#)).

According to Mietzner, in contrast to his predecessors, President SBY succeeded in enforcing military compliance in Aceh to make peace after the Tsunami in 2004. This success was also an acknowledgment of his predecessor, President Megawati, who preferred to use a military approach to combating GAM and made almost no effort to achieve peace. This policy was resisted by GAM, which chose to continue fighting the legitimate government ([Aspinall, 2005](#)).

During the Joko Widodo administration (2014-Present), President Joko Widodo appointed retired military generals to fill three cabinet positions, namely Minister of Defense General Ryamizard Ryacudu; Coordinating Minister for the Economy Lieutenant General Luhut B. Panjaitan and Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs General Wiranto. He even appointed General Moeldoko as Head of the Presidential Office. He proposed re-adopting Dwifungsi by employing active military officers in certain government offices. President Joko Widodo is encircled by nine retired generals in his cabinet and other decision-making positions. In addition to three ministers, there are four members of the Presidential Advisory Council, one Head of the Intelligence Agency, and one Head of the Presidential Office ([Kosandi & Wahono, 2020](#)). Thus, the military group is still very influential in the government.

An interesting analysis of why President Jokowi recruited active military retired generals was put up by Muhtadi. According to him, Jokowi's previous position could have been more involved in the dynamics of elite politics at the central level. Hence, recruiting retired military officers who had held strategic positions was an

option to make rapid adaptations and expand presidential support. This decision was strategic because Luhut, Ryamizad, and Wiranto are experienced military and business figures with extensive networks and influence in civilian groups (Muhtadi, 2015). In addition to cabinet recruitment, President Jokowi has also begun to expand the military's role in civilian affairs. As published in IPAC Report, the most obvious example is when Jokowi gave authority to the TNI to assist the Ministry of Agriculture in its policy of stabilizing the price of basic needs. According to Prastiti and Alexander's records, by 2018, the military had more than 30 MOUs with ministries and other state institutions that allowed them to take care of the civilian domain (Prastiti & Alexander, 2018). According to Azwar and Suryana's research, the military even entered the educational landscape by organizing film screenings of the 30 September movement in schools, in an agenda that should be the sole domain of civilians, in this case, the Ministry of Education and Culture Research and Technology (Azwar & Suryana, 2021).

The most notable policy regarding the military in the Jokowi era is his policy to re-deploy active TNI officers in many civilian institutions. On the one hand, this policy is an initiative to give opportunities and positions to middle- and high-ranking officers in the TNI, where there are large human resources but relatively limited positions in the military. This policy was welcomed by the TNI Commander at the time Hadi Tjahjanto, who explicitly conveyed plans for a restructuring military by appointing military to serve in civilian positions in Ministries and Institutions (Hilal et al., 2022).

The policy of allowing active military to hold civilian positions became controversial on the part of democracy activists in particular. This is because President Jokowi is considered to want to reactivate the ABRI Dwifungsi, which was implemented during the New Order era and was one of the reform demands to be abolished. According to Mengko, three potential problems arise if the involvement of active TNI in the military continues, especially in policy and civilian positions. First, President Jokowi did not give a timeframe for the military to be actively involved in the civilian policy sphere. The problem is that if this continues, it will cause confusion between defense, security, and law enforcement functions. According to the Coordinating Minister, military involvement in civilian operations or policies is only temporary (Mengko & Fitri, 2020).

Secondly, President Jokowi has never explained the reasons for military involvement, which results in the difficulty of estimating the budget's proportionality and the budget needed to involve the TNI in the realm of civilian policies. For example, in terms of handling COVID-19 in the 2020-2022 period, the deployment of 340,000 TNI personnel is a fantastic number and involves a large budget consolidation. In comparison, in the United States, the maximum number of TNIs involved in a policy or public affairs is 55,000 people, with various missions. Likewise, in the United Kingdom, which reached 20,000 but was later significantly reduced to only 7,500 personnel. Third, there is no detailed calculation of the impact of the TNI's assignment into the civilian domain on the military's readiness. Given the threat dynamics of defense that can occur at any time, military readiness to face various regional and global dynamics becomes distracted by involvement in various civilian policies. This means that the calculation of the impact of military readiness as its main function in defense should remain focused and maintained.

Based on this explanation, five main reforms have taken place since the downfall of the New Order in 1998, namely: Depoliticization, Separation of the police from the TNI, Paradigm shift, Reform of the internal military structure, and

Elimination of military business ([Honna, 2013](#)). However, problems with the territorial command (Koter) still need to be reformed from the Habibie administration to Joko Widodo. The territorial command structure refers to the territorial placement of military bases throughout Indonesia that allows the military to gain political advantage vis-à-vis the opposition by controlling local governments, supporting political intelligence services, indoctrination, and securing military interests in every region in Indonesia ([Sebastian et al., 2018](#)).

In addition to Honna's explanation, Kosandi & Wahono (2020) added a third phase (2014-present): the military's role consolidated and legitimized through the acceptance of civilian elites and even the public. In this phase, the military enjoys a new role as a partner in politics and government, even though it is informal and indirect. Following this, Haripin explain that the military's political role that works today is inseparable from Indonesia's historical experience, which has always placed the military in national and regional politics ([Haripin, 2019](#)). For example, the reinterpretation of General Nasution's "middle way" doctrine, namely that the military is not dominated by civilian groups but also does not dominate civilian groups. This can also be seen in the "new paradigm" military doctrine that developed after the 1998 reform movement ([Haripin et al., 2020](#)).

Conclusion

Based on the above analysis, the factors affecting the military's reform role are the President's leadership, conflicts between civilian elites, conflicts in the regions, the military's internal condition, historical development, and doctrine. The military has stagnated in reform, but the group has much greater political influence than in the early days of reform. Even so, its political influence is informal.

The military's informal influence has had a different impact on the policies of Indonesia's post-reform presidents. In the era of President BJ Habibie, the military still dominated. However, it was later given limits by the president, especially to stop the ABRI Dwifungsi policy as mandated by reform. However, conflicts arose between Habibie as a civilian president and ABRI in the referendum policy in East Timor, resulting in declining military support. In the Abdurrahman Wahid era, the influence of informal groups declined relatively due to Gus Dur's bold policies, especially in enforcing human rights. For example, Gus Dur's policy of encouraging a human rights approach to Papuan separatists was opposed by the TNI, which continued to use a military and security approach. During the Megawati administration, the military's influence was strengthened by retired military officers in Benny Moerdani's circle of influence. Several public positions at both internal TNI levels, Ministries/Institutions, and executive positions, such as Governor, were filled by various retired TNI personnel. However, one of the criticisms of Megawati's policy was the TNI's forceful security approach towards Aceh and the strong resistance from GAM, which resulted in heavy civilian casualties. In the SBY era, the influence of informal groups was seen in his efforts to fully revoke TNI business units in various fields so that TNI's independence focused only on defense affairs. Another achievement of the SBY era was the TNI's full support for the peace policy in Aceh and strategically stopping GAM operations in Aceh. The influence of informal groups has returned in President Jokowi's era with his policy of recruiting retired military generals in various strategic posts in civilian ministries. Unlike his predecessors, the influence of the informal military group is quite strong, as marked by President Jokowi's policy to reactivate the

ABRI Dwifungsi. The policy provides opportunities for active TNI to return to fill positions in civilian ministries/institutions.

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