



Original Article

Driving Factors Behind Turkey's Establishment of the Turkey-Russia Joint Center in 2020

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Abstract:

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 that attracted the attention of international actors, especially Turkey and Russia. In times of peace of conflict, Turkey entered into an agreement with Russia to carry out the construction of the Turkish-Russian Joint Center. The purpose of this study is to find out the factors that are the reasons for Turkey to make an agreement with Russia in establishing a Joint Turkish-Russian Center. Using qualitative descriptive research methods with data and information collection techniques in accordance with references from books, journals, and articles on the web. The theory used is the decision-making theory initiated by Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, that "the actions of a country are foreign policies that are influenced by internal and external conditions". The first is Turkey's dependence on Russia in nuclear projects and agreements on the purchase of military equipment, while in the external sphere there is a great influence of Russia's geopolitics in the Caucasus region as well as in the conflict.

Keywords: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey, Russia, Combined Center

Introduction

The Nagorno-Karabakh regional dispute conflict is an old conflict that heated up again in 2020. Due to the accusations from the Armenian side of the attack on the city of Vardenis carried out by Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan also accused Armenia of carrying out the attack on the city of Dashkasan first. As a result of these mutual accusations, the conflict broke up again, attracting the attention of many international actors, especially Turkey and Russia.

Specifically, Turkey and Russia played their role in the peace process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia managed to end the conflict with the signing of a ceasefire agreement by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia on November 9, 2020. Then Turkey also succeeded in inviting Russia to make an agreement on the establishment of the Turkey-Russia Joint Center on November 10, 2020. The agreement was followed up with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) related to the establishment of the joint center by Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on November 11, 2020. So that the Joint Turkey-Russia Center can be inaugurated on January



<https://jurnal.usk.ac.id/riwayat>

30, 2021 by Azerbaijan Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov, Turkish Deputy Defense Minister Yunus Emre, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin ([De Waal, 2010](#)).

The supervision management of this joint center is led by Major General Abdullah Katirci from the Turkish side, and Major General Viktor Fedorenko from the Russian side. The majority of Turkish and Russian militaries work using drones or drones. The urgency of the Joint Turkish-Russian Center is to oversee the ceasefire agreement.

The involvement of Turkey with Russia in the peace process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is very interesting to understand in depth. Many previous studies from several literature reviews present discussions that are very relevant to this research. Starting from the research of Abisatya Kurnia Jati and her colleagues with the title "Analysis of Turkey's Involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Case Study of the September War 2020" which explained that Turkey was involved in the September War because it had national interests with Azerbaijan. Next, a study by Kaan Diyarbakirlioglu entitled "The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia from the Historical Perspective" explained that the conflict occurred for many years due to Russian policy interference in the region. Then, a study by Nimra Irfan entitled "Armenia – Azerbaijan Relations: Nagorno Karabakh Conflict and its Peace Process" which discusses the chronology of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations which is influenced by several political factors and ethnic differences to attract several parties to be involved in resolving the conflict. The last is a study by Jodi Misyendi entitled "Analysis of the Role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan" which discusses the role of the OSCE in handling the conflict, until there is a failure in the mediation effort ([Jati et al., 2022](#); [Irfan et al., 2021](#); [Diyarbakirlioglu, 2020](#)).

With the connection with several previous studies, this study seeks to present a more specific set of information on the aspects that are the driving factors for Turkey to make an agreement with Russia in the establishment of the Joint Turkish-Russian Center 2020 ([Abidah, 2024](#)).

Methods

This research method uses descriptive research with a qualitative approach in order to be able to answer the question of why and be able to explain a problem that is being discussed. In addition, the data sources obtained are secondary data sources that are not directly aimed at the research subject. This set of data was obtained from a literature study of various sources, namely books, archives, journals, and the results of previous research research.

This study uses the decision-making theories of Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin to find out what factors are the reasons why Turkey made an agreement with Russia in the establishment of the Joint Turkish-Russian Center ([Wood, 2014](#)). This theory has a basic assumption that a country takes action because of foreign interests or policies that must be fulfilled for its country in the internal and external scope. From these actions, it will then consider significant differences and be able to analyze the behavior of the state, so that there will be an agreement between the two countries that have the goal of mutual benefit. This theory assumes that analyzing foreign policy must consider four elements, namely actors, objectives, methods, and situations ([Hudson & Day, 2019](#)). In this case, the actor is the state. The goal is the national interest to be achieved. The way is a diplomatic instrument that the state uses to achieve its goals. A situation is a condition of internal or external factors that are able to influence how decision-makers formulate policies ([Snyder et](#)

[al., 2002\).](#)

Therefore, in this study, it can be understood through the analysis of Richard Snyder's Decision-Making theory, a country's foreign policy has two aspects, namely internal and external. From these two aspects, it contains a grouping of categories of factors that can affect the occurrence of a country's actions.

Results

The failure of the Minsk Group's efforts to stop the conflict in Nagorno, Karabakh, has led Turkey to criticize the performance of the OSCE Minsk Group (the United States, France, and Russia). Turkey advised Russia to have direct dialogue with it, as it did during the dialogues in Syria and Libya that would exclude the power of western diplomats. Of course, Russia agrees to anything that guarantees the elimination of the influence of the United States and France from regional diplomacy in the Caucasus, including Nagorno-Karabakh ([ROUSSEAU et al., 1963](#)).

After negotiations took place to stake their respective positions in international public opinion, Erdoğan contacted Putin to immediately emphasize the importance of Turkey in the OSCE Minsk Group decision as well as stating that Turkey would contribute constructively to the resolution of the conflict. And officially Erdoğan and Putin announced their involvement in the determination of the ceasefire on November 10, 2020. Although the text of the agreement on the monitoring center has not yet been made public, the principle of equality is indicated by the composition of personnel and is often emphasized by Turkish and Russian political leaders, who suggest that the same principle also applies to decision-making. Otherwise, one side could dominate the other, and the weaker position is clearly unacceptable to both Ankara and Moscow.

If decision-making is truly based on consensus, this does not necessarily indicate the efficiency of the monitoring mechanism. And if there is a dispute between Turkey and Russia regarding the situation on the ground, it will be included in the actions of Russian peacekeepers as well. It has often been seen in frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet region that Russia itself is ready to abuse decision-making based on structural consensus by blocking any decision, thus effectively prolonging the conflict, not resolving it.

In accordance with the categorical grouping of variables that can affect the actions of one country, there are 4 driving factors that are the reasons why Turkey invited Russia to agree to establish a Joint Center. The first is in the internal scope there are two aspects, namely economic and military aspects.

a) Economic Field

In the economic field, there are two important factors that are the driving factors for Turkey to agree with Russia to establish a Joint Turkish-Russian Center. The first is because Russia is a natural gas energy supplier that Turkey relies on. The second is due to the dependence on financing for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant construction project on the basis of cooperation between Turkey and Russia.

Turkey is a NATO member country, and Turkey is trying to maintain good relations with Russia despite being hampered by the war in Ukraine. At that time, the great desire of Russian President Vladimir Putin was to create a new market for Russian hydrocarbons located outside Europe, and emphasized his desire that the regional gas center of his country,

Turkey, was interested in market prices.

Turkey's economy is heavily influenced by the industrial and service sectors. As the most important and most important sector in Turkey's exports that is able to make Turkey a country with rapid economic growth, Turkey will need more access to fossil fuel resources to be able to meet the increasing energy demand. With its limitations in domestic energy sources, it will create a great dependence on energy imports, especially on oil and gas. Such conditions have led Turkey to take steps to always ensure supply security by diversifying its supply sources and improving all related infrastructure ([Balat, 2010](#)).

Turkey gets its natural gas through gas pipelines and some have been varied in a liquid form known as LNG (Liquified Natural Gas). Turkey gets a fraction of its gas needs through LNG from Algeria and Nigeria, with contracts to supply Turkey at 4.4 bcm and 1.3 bcm per year, respectively. Meanwhile, most of Turkey's gas needs are obtained from gas pipelines; 2 gas pipelines come from Russia, and there are also from Azerbaijan and Iran. Russia with its West-Line and Blue Stream supplies 14 bcm and 16 bcm per year, respectively, while Azerbaijan 6.6 bcm and Iran 9.6 bcm per year. Then in June 2018, Turkey succeeded in inaugurating a new gas pipeline in cooperation with Azerbaijan that extends from east to west of Turkey, called TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline). TANAP is expected to be able to bring 6 bcm of natural gas from Azerbaijan for consumption in Turkey ([Wiku et al., 2022](#)).

According to the Energy Information Agency (EIA), Russia is a country with large oil and natural gas reserves and is even the second largest producer of dry natural gas in the world. In addition, Russia is the largest exporter of natural gas to the global gas market, thus contributing significantly to the Russian government's export revenue and taxes.

When viewed from the two national interests of Turkey and Russia, cooperation in increasing gas exports and imports is very dependent and reciprocal. And the level of vulnerability that Turkey will experience if Russia stops the supply of its natural gas pipelines will soar and have an impact on its economic growth, in terms of economic growth, Turkey is able to grow rapidly because of the industrial sector that depends on natural gas supplies from other countries. And President Erdogan himself has stated that Russia is the most reliable gas supplier country by Turkey to date.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict occurred in 2020, at that time at the same time as the implementation of Turkey's cooperation with Russia in a major project to build the Akkuyu nuclear power plant or Turkiye Akuyyu Nuclear where in the project Russia supplies natural gas to Turkey through several available pipelines. This cooperation includes bilateral cooperation in the energy sector. The Akkuyu nuclear power plant project is a major step for Turkey in developing energy capacity and to strengthen economic ties between the two countries (aa.com.tr/id, 2020).

The Turkiye Akkuyu Nuclear project is located near the city of Mersin in Turkey's southern coastal region, the Mediterranean Sea. The location is a very strategic location for a stable energy supply, and it is able to reduce Turkey's dependence on fossil energy sources. Turkey agreed to develop this project so that their country can increase domestic energy capacity and reduce dependence on energy imports. This is certainly very beneficial for Turkey, because it is able to increase their country's economic growth rapidly and make Turkey one of the countries with the largest power plants ([Tsabaris et al., 2021](#)).

The beginning of the bilateral cooperation agreement between Turkey and Russia was

on May 12, 2010 with the signing of an agreement on the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant at the Akkuyu site by the Government of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey. In 2020, the development has reached several stages of basic infrastructure development in the foundation of the second electric power unit, and has obtained permits for the construction of the third unit. It is planned that this project will start operating in 2023-2024 in accordance with the phased operation until full capacity is reached.

The Russian president dared to describe the nuclear power plant construction project as the largest project in the world in the history of Turkey's relations with Russia. The Akkuyu project is managed by Akkuyu Nuclear JSC, a company founded by Russia and Turkey, and the majority of the company's shares are shares owned by the Rosatom Company. Rosatom is a Russian-owned nuclear energy company that will be responsible for the design, construction and entire operation of the nuclear power plant.

So it can be concluded that all financing and investment in the Türkiye Akkuyu Nuclear project is borne or charged to Russia. The \$20 billion project is equipped with a generation capacity of 4,800 megawatts (MW) in Akkuyu and also 4 nuclear reactors. With the nuclear power plant, Turkey will join countries that have nuclear energy plants with civilian purposes. Therefore, Turkey is trying hard to maintain the stability of its diplomatic relations with Russia so that this project succeeds perfectly. The success of this project will provide long-term benefits for Turkey, especially in economic growth.

b) Military Field

Since 1990, Turkey has had a desire to upgrade its robust air defense system in order to protect its territory from potential threats from other countries. The existence of World War II made the emergence of two opposing powers to compete to become the most influential country. The United States and the Soviet Union are superpowers that have extraordinarily large military and economic power. The competition between the two countries has created two directions of power, namely the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc.

After World War II, Turkey began to receive threats little by little from the Soviet Union which was trying to expand its power to all parts of the world, one of which was by trying to claim power in the Black Sea. The Soviet Union had the intention of gaining access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus Strait. This action certainly threatens Turkey, because of the existence of its country that connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. With the large military power possessed by the Soviet Union, Turkey was worried and upset, because Turkey felt that their strength was not comparable. With such an urgent threat, Turkey decided to join the NATO alliance ([Balcer, 2009](#)).

After Turkey's accession to NATO, Turkey received a lot of military equipment and economic assistance that came from the United States. And Turkey became one of NATO's main lines in Europe that became a stem from the expansion of the Soviet Union's influence. NATO also built a lot of its military boundaries and placed its missiles in Turkey to be directed to the Soviet Union. At the time, Turkey had Nike Hercules missiles from the United States used for its air defense systems. But with the passage of time and the rapid development of technology, the weapon is no longer able to protect Turkish airspace ([Turki, 2023](#)).

Then Turkey received offers from four foreign companies related to defense system weapons, namely the United States offered the MIM-104 Patriot system, Russia offered the S-300, China offered the FD-2000, and the French and Italian joint Eurosam company submitted the SAMP-T. The discussion of the offer is quite complicated due to the cost limitations that Turkey has. Finally, on September 12, 2017, Turkey signed an agreement for the purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia and the two sides agreed to the contract with a cost agreement of \$2.5 billion. The cost is for the purchase of one package of the S-400 system which includes 4 main S-400 batteries, target radar, and other system support equipment. The United States and NATO had opposed Turkey's unilateral decision to purchase the S-400 missile because they thought the system would interfere with the defense system. But Turkey ignored the opposition and continued to buy the S-400 missile defense system.

After going through the negotiation process after the signing of the agreement, Russia also made a favorable offer to Turkey, namely a technology transfer offer so that Turkey can operate the S-400 easily. Not only that, but Russia always makes it easier for Turkey to be more flexible in the payment process. Turkey also asked Russia to be willing to arrange some of the components of the S-400 to be produced in Turkey. Of course, Turkey is very happy about it because the procurement of such a defense system is not obtained from the United States or NATO allies. Until the delivery of the S-400 defense system was carried out faster than the agreement that had been agreed with the first batch delivery in 2019, then the delivery of the second batch in 2020.

The S-400 air defense system, known as the SA-21 Growler, is a long-range air defense system designed by a Russian defense company that has been developed since 1993. The S-400 system is an adaptation of the S-200 and S-300 systems in the form of missile, launcher, and radar storage containers of about 70-80%. It was then resumed in 2007 as a defense system in Moscow. The missile system is designed in such a way that it serves to destroy aircraft, ships, and ballistic missiles. In addition, this missile is also capable of destroying all installations on land.

The S-400 missile has been among the most advanced air defense systems in its class and has made many countries worried about the development of Russian weapons. This missile is also one of the target products from various parts of the world. Its radar is capable of tracking the enemy as far as 600km and can maximally intercept the enemy within a distance of 400km. This missile also has the ability to target enemies with a total of 300 targets. If taken into economic terms, the S-400 missile is not a weapon in the cheap class. Because if it is used in every war, the costs that must be incurred will be proportional to what is produced.

Turkey is strongly considering its efforts to improve its air defense system. In addition, Turkey also always considers all potential cooperation with other countries in the defense and security of its territory because this concerns the threats it will face. So that Turkey can decide on the S-400 which according to its capabilities and functions is able to meet Turkey's needs. Russia also justified it. So with the decision to buy this defense system from Russia, it provides a great opportunity for Turkey to be able to cooperate with Russia more easily and efficiently (Novikova, 2021).

Russia's availability to offer its air defense system is an advantage for Turkey. Because so far, Russia has had the best reputation for the quality and quantity of weapons it

produces. Turkey itself feels that Russia has technological advantages that surpass Turkey's capabilities. Therefore, building closer cooperation with Russia will allow Turkey to be able to fulfill its national interests to get assistance amid the limitations of its capabilities in the international scope. At the same time, it is also able to reduce the level of threat with Russia's withdrawal as a threatening country.

In the external sphere, there are also two factors that are the reason why Turkey invited Russia, namely the great influence of Russian geopolitics in the South Caucasus region and also Russia's attitude in the conflict.

1. Russian Geopolitical Influence in the South Caucasus Region

The Caucasus was a rivalry between the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires that involved the mixing of cultures on existing transit routes. The competition is in the form of religious, ethnic, and imperialistic offers. The Caucasus region is located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, with a territory consisting of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The region is geographically located along roads that connect north to south and east to west. The Southern Caucasus often witnessed foreign invasions and power struggles between Russia, Ottomans, and Persians ([Vosoughi Fallahi, 2020](#)).

The South Caucasus became one of the border zones between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were tensions and various grievances that could be suppressed in the cold war. It will also inevitably lead Western countries to move into areas under the control of the former Soviet Union by building partnerships and developing cooperation programs. But with the fierce competition that exists to gain great influence in the region, tensions have increased between Russia, Turkey and Iran. It is this tension that has become the history of territorial, nationalist, ethnic, and religious disputes throughout the region.

In the post-Cold War era, the geopolitics of the South Caucasus were growing. Especially with the interests of the nearest regional countries (Russia, Turkey, Iran), and the existence of global powers (the United States, the European Union, and European countries). And during the 1990s, the most prominent actors were Russia, Turkey and Iran, as they quite exerted a lot of influence in culture and semi-politics with economic nuances. At the same time, Russia and Turkey are experiencing fierce competition in the political, ethnic, economic, energy, security, and state fields. Turkey has received support from the Western Bloc, especially the United States, as a liaison with countries in the region. But still they feel constrained by the presence of Russian soldiers in their territory because it is a legacy of Soviet-era agreements with various military bases. In addition, there has also been an increase in ethnic conflicts, of which Russia is one of the actors.

In August 2008 there was a war between Georgia and Russia that greatly affected regional geopolitics, making the countries in the Caucasus region realize that Russia will do anything to achieve its national interests and they do not have the ability to prevent it. At that time, Turkey made a change in its foreign policy to the Middle East and had a definite calculation that if it cooperated with Russia in all neighboring regions, it would be able to produce very satisfactory results compared to choosing to compete with Russia.

Russia's position in the region itself is also the most powerful actor. Since his meeting with the Russian special representative held in Moscow, the meeting has had symbolic

significance for Turkey. Not only does it signal that it supports Russia, but it also makes clear its willingness to participate in the conflict process and focus its surveillance position. Perhaps Turkey itself prefers to hold a meeting in a neutral place, but Turkey also agrees to Russia's role given the Russian-Turkish coalition in the South Caucasus. Similarly, the existence of internal problems of the European Union and the decline in interest in the region after the sharing of energy resources have increased the influence of the Russian Federation as Russia has developed its relations with Azerbaijan and expanded its control over Armenia.

After the emergence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it was able to explain that the role of the West is weakening, including the presence of the OSCE Minsk Group and the Russian-Turkish partnership and competition for the future of the South Caucasus. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict certainly made a change in the balance of power in the region. Georgia itself is confident that it will not get involved if Armenia and Azerbaijan sign its peace treaty.

In this regard, Russia and Turkey have both increased their role and influence in the conflict. Russia, which has stationed its army as peacekeepers on the territory of Azerbaijan, and Turkey, which is increasing its military presence in Azerbaijan, is ready to receive huge benefits from regional impact in any form. In general, the role of the West here suffers greatly due to a lack of strategy and a lack of interest in the conflict, resulting in a significant weakening of national (American, European, French) and institutional (OSCE Minsk Group) influence. Russia will also have to contend with Turkey's growing influence over its encouragement and support for Baku in the conflict zone for its military success.

Russia's main goal in this conflict is to project itself as the dominant military and security actor and to distance itself from the West. With the deployment of 2000 military troops, Russia has troops in all three regions of the South Caucasus. The withdrawal of Armenian troops in the Nagorno-Karabakh region makes Russia the de facto protector of the region.

2. Russia's Attitude to the Conflict

On October 10, 2020, Russia acted as a mediator of the 2020 ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh with the intention of stopping fighting between ethnic Armenian forces and Azerbaijani forces, not exchanging prisoners and becoming victims of war. The negotiations are the first talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the September 27, 2020 fighting ([Presidency of The Republic of Turkiye, 2020](#)).

Russia's efforts to mediate the conflict have received support from France and the United States, which share the same position as OSCE chair. The OSCE facilitated negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh by deploying a series of three humanitarian ceasefires to create security. Until finally on November 9, 2020, Russia was able to mediate a ceasefire when Armenia was on the verge of defeat ([Kropatcheva, 2012](#)).

The success is an achievement that allows Russia to keep peacekeepers in the region for at least five years. However, Russia must continue to try to balance its relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Russia, its success as a mediator between the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will confirm its leading role in the region.

The deployment of Russian troops to Azerbaijan is of particular concern, because

with this there will be a perception of a new freeze in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process. With this, Russia must make a decision to maintain its troops on Azerbaijani soil even after the end of five years according to its agreement as a peacekeeper. De facto Russia maintains its military presence on the territory of Azerbaijan, including its task of maintaining stability in the Nagorno-Karabakh region even after the expiration of the agreement in 2025. The treaty stipulated a cessation of armed hostilities along the lines of the conflict at that time. In order to prevent the total destruction of the Armenian army and also prevent greater losses ([Presidency of The Republic of Turkiye, 2020](#)).

During the entire Armenian armed forces deployed to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Russia also deployed its peacekeeping contingent to enforce the ceasefire and guarantee its stability interests. Not only the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Russian peacekeepers also secured the Lachin region which openly and permanently has land links between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

Russia's military power is an important element when it comes to defense security and war to achieve its interests. Providing peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh has allowed Russia to enjoy the economic growth and diplomatic activity that Armenia has developed, and shows that this is its effort to balance its diplomatic relations. And Russia was able to pave its own path as its energy supremacy by creating obstacles for Azerbaijan to be unable to enter the European market with its gas supplies.

Russia itself considers the South Caucasus region to be an important region for its security and national interests. His approach to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenia is an important component of supporting its southern security. The conflict here has changed the balance of interests in the south for Russia, thus creating a gap for Turkey to take part in the conflict. Russia under Putin's rule, and Turkey under Erdogan's government are forced to cooperate in this conflict.

Russia and Turkey have their respective roles in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan to gain their national interests. Turkey, which has strained relations with Armenia, used its support for Azerbaijan to put pressure on Armenia. Meanwhile, Russia has an interest in maintaining relations and ensuring security for Armenia as an economic and trade partner.

Conclusion

Broadly speaking, this study found that there are 4 driving factors behind Turkey to make an agreement with Russia in establishing the 2020 Turkey-Russia Joint Center. In the internal scope, namely Turkey's dependence on Russia in the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project and natural gas energy supply, as well as the ongoing S-400 missile purchase agreement with Russia.

The need for natural gas energy suppliers is quite large, making Turkey must have sufficient energy storage capacity. In addition, Turkey is also joining the cooperation in the development of the Turkiye Akkuyu Nuclear with Russia, which is planned to start operation in 2020. The construction is quite costly and is the largest nuclear development project with all project financing borne by Russia. If Turkey unleashes this great opportunity, then its dream of growing a high-caliber economy and a reputation in the global market will be destroyed. The need for Turkey's defense system also depends on Russia, because at that time Turkey had made a transaction to purchase an air defense system with Russia, namely the S-400 Missile at a fairly high cost and was in the second batch delivery stage. The defense system is used as Turkey's main system to maintain its country's security.

Meanwhile, in the external sphere, due to Russia's geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus Region and Russia's attitude towards the conflict. Russia has great influence in its military and defense. Other countries are quite calculating when they want to conflict with Russia. Considering that Russia has a very big ambition to make its country the most powerful and influential actor in the region. Including in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia strengthened its influence so that it can be seen by the international public that Russia has a big role and is directly involved in resolving the conflict.

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